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J'/ • r~ ~y 
DO 1.\v' .. ...:. . .......... v'£ 
RDWUCS OP SKNATOR MIJCE MA!fSFIILD (D., MOJrl'AM) . 
at the M A.. IN FILE COPY 
DC '\JOT REMOVE 
National Conference ot Christians &Dd J eva 
Hotel. Robert '!Teat, Newark, Bew Jersey 
Thursday, February 16, 1967 
6:30p.m. 
BROTBERliOOD AID WORLD PIACB 
We meet at a time when glimmers ot PMCe in Viet lfam have 
appeared &Dd1 then, diaa.ppeared. The prospects for a prompt termiD&tion 
of the war bave dissolved once asain• 
The ettort to britlg thia conflict to an ead, however, has not 
been tutil.e. The words ot peace are nov sharper; their meanings are t10V 
clearer. The vflry fact that serious efforts to bring about peace do recur 
ia evidence or the strength ot the will tor peace. It is evidence of a 
re8PC)nae to the prayers tor peace which rise up trom every religious faith 
and trom all parts of the vorl4. 
The urge to peace in Viet Nam is as one with the purposes ot 
the Rational Conference ot Cbristian.e &D4 Jeva. This organization has 
stood tor dec-.iea tor civ1lity and w:aderat.ocUng uong peoples of differ-
ing ~e.ta. It haa &lao been, in a broader HnH, a symbol of the search 
tor univera&l brotherhood. That which ia h1gbeat in man has lDng harbored 
the hope for a regathering of the trasnentecl human fmil.y. That which is 
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closest in 1B&D. to what is fundamental in all faiths urges h1m to establish 
bonds of understanding among races, creeds, cultures and nations. 
What blocks that understanding, in its simplest statement, is 
the relucta.Dce to acknowledge for others the ria,hts and respect which one 
deaumds for oneself'. By the sasae taken, at the bottom of the international 
1nstabil1 ty of the past two dec-'les, very otten has been the same short-
coming. The late President, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, observed that peace 
is "in the last analysis basic~ a matter of human rights.'' In October 
1965, Pope Paul VI gave stress to this point vhen he visited the United 
Nations. H« linked, as inseparable, respect tor the dignity of the hum&ll 
person, brotherhood and world peace. A s111l1lar awareness of this trinity 
has led men of religion, whether leaders or laymen, to becocae involved in 
problema of the social condition of man--of the adequacy of the relation-
ships among men and nations. 
The search for equity and unity is also seen, on occasion, in 
the contemporary relations among nations. The same spirit which brought 
about the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, for example, led representatives 
of sixty nations to gather at the White House on January 28 to sign a treaty 
barring m111tary weapons 1'rom outer space. Earlier in the month, President 
Johnson reaffirmed the goal of' buildins bridges between East and West. He 
had previously referred to this soaJ. in these words: "Our task is to 
achieve a reconciliation with the East--a shift f'rciD the narrow concept of 
coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement." Most recently, 
the President hu urged the Congress to pass an East-West Trade bill during 
this session and to approve a consular convention with the Soviet Union. 
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Conetructi ve iDd1cat1oll8 of this kind, however, are still the 
exception in the over-all state of world affair a. The fact remains that 
no significant area of the world ia yet tree of the h1Sb walla of hoatUi ty 
buUt by preJudice, geed, fear, hatred and hUID&Il 1ndifference. Bo area 
is tree of the instabUity which comes with the widespread existeace of 
these and other ills of the social order. 
The continent of Africa, far example, 1a in the grip of an 
epidemic of toppling regimes which is symptomatic of this instability. 
Regrettably, the •111.Ptome COM to lipt at a t:lae of sr•t social and 
economic upheaval. Africa is confronted with the eimul.taneou. need tor 
an adjustment of outdated colonial MDtalities, far the wholesale tranafer 
of human loyalties fl'oal the tribal all tbe way to the nation-state and tar 
a reordering of a sreat range of ancieot ecoDOIIlic riaiditiea. 
TheM cooatitute eDOI'IIIIOu. cb•llenses to African leadership and 
to the African people. They are challenpa, IIOZ'eOver, which have to be 
met, even aa the continent is pl.:ualeting into a npidly unfolding tuture 
f'rcm an arrested. aDd unchuaed put. Regettably, for Ahicana, there is 
little in the way of a definable present in which meo and nations ~work 
out at leisure a rationalAt for theM nw relationships. In consequence, 
years if not decades of 1natabU1ty looaa ahM4 for Africa &Dod ramifications 
of it will be felt througtlout the rest of the world. 
In the Middle Bast, there is aot only an absence of a stable 
peace, as there long has 'been, but there 1e &110 a ab.U"p r1H in the 
level. of instability. The ID08t eeriou. Arab-IU'aeli lll111tary clash of 
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recent years erupted Just a tw months aso. The lid of peace which was 
restored by the United lfations is1 in my J~nt, a most unreliable one. 
In no eenee does it lessen the sources ot unrest and provocation along 
the borders ot Israel. Nor does it deal with the problem of the division 
ot waters ot the Jol"'dan River and other maJor Arab-Israeli issues. 
The tensiona which plague the Middle East ere not confined to 
the relations of Israel and the Arab states. In the Yemen, tor example, 
a little known but atrocious war goes on grimly year after year. And, in 
Aden, tens of tbouaanda of Bri tisb forces are still required to maintain 
a curfewed order in what has lons been a city of terror. 
Ot increasing concern, too, is the &rlllB race uong Middle Eastern 
nations. The concern is now intea.sitied by the prospect ot nuclear arma-
ments gaining a foothold 1n the region. There is em obvious need to curb 
the competition trom outside, particularly in the trade of sophisticated 
arms in the Middle East. I regret to say, however, that the area remains 
a truittul one for the international 81"1118 peddler•· I regret to nay, too, 
that alona with the SoTiet Union and other nations, we have been unable or 
unwilling to come to serious grips with this question. 
The continent of Europe is, t.o<lay, one ot the more reassuring 
areas ot the world. It is prosperous and tree of it1minent threats of 
contl.ict. Nevertheless the Europe.ns, too, have to face up to long overdue 
adjuetmente in their relationships. The concepts which are imbedded in 
both the North Atlantic Tr•ty Orsanization and the Warsaw Pact are in 
need of major modifications. The tille is long past due, tor example, tor 
a reduction of military forces stationed beyond home borders 1n countries 
1n both Eutern aDd Western Burope. 
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I should note in this connection that a joint group of the 
Senate Conrnittees on Armed Servi.cee and Foreign Relations v1ll. consider 
a Resolution which calls for e. substantial reduction of u.s. torceo in 
Europe. This resolution which vas introduced by me on behalf of 44 
members of the Senate embodies, in DIY' jud.~nt, a moat needed adjustment 
in our policies with respect to .Europe. 
There is one overridins reason for this resolution. Times have 
changed in Europe. Our policies on military deployment which have kept 
a mill1on American defense personnel and dependents in Western Europe 
twenty years after World War II are out of date. The obvious tact is 
the.t econOl!lic and other friendly contact has steadily replaced the fear 
and hostility which previously characterized the relationship between 
Western and Ea~ttern Europe. The likelihood, liOl"eover 1 18 for a continuance 
and speeding np of the thav in the continental climate. 
Looking to the sout.'l, Latin America remains in the throes of 
grea.t change. Old social syste'lls are crumbling. Profound political 
upheavals are taking place. Economic modernization is proceeding at an 
uneven but, in some instances, frenetic pace. 'l'he structures of m.an.y of 
the nations of this Hemisphere are evolving rap1clly towards new but as yet 
undetermined forms. 
In the end, it is to be hoped that this change v111 give sub-
stance to the ideals of 1ntra-hem1~heric cooperation as they are ex-
pressed in the Alliance for Progress. In the meantilllfl, the peopl e of 
Latin America remain divided by countless religious, ethnic, and ot.~er 
barriers, which block the development ot an integrated stabUity. 
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Bovever, the beginnings of significant iq>rovement in tlle situation are 
to be found in aany countries. In aomey (as in Mexico from which I have 
Juat returned), it is 110re than just a beginning. Mexico is well on the 
vay, in terms of broad and rapid national. progress. It is in the vanguard 
in Latin America and is able even now to make a maJor contribution of in-
spiration and technology beyond its borders to the advance of other Latin 
American nations. 
In Southern Asia, there remains the hostility between India and 
Pakistan. It is baaed in part on conflicting territorial claim.s over 
JCaehm1r, but perhaps more :fundamentally it stems from old wounds and 
ancient communal fears. Throughout the vorld, the hope had been that the 
Tashkent Declaration which vas negotiated by India and Pakistan, with 
Soviet intercession would lead to genuine reconciliation. Yet the first 
anniversary of tb.at declaration passed, only weeks ago, not With an assured 
peace but with a new exchange of bitter recriminations. It is apparent 
tbat there has been no baaic easing of tensions. The Soviet Union, having, 
so to speak, taken over the Kashmir questj.on :from the United Nations by 
its initiative at Taahkent last year has a continuing re~nsib1lity to 
try to resolve the difficulty before it flares, once again, into open con-
flict. 
I suppose it is a good deal less pain:tul. to consider the problema 
which conb"ont other nations than to examine those which face this nation. 
Xevertheless, ve we it to ourselves to look honestly at our own situation. 
I lllUSt say, in all frankness, that the situation at home gives cause for 
aober concern and at the core of the concern is Viet 1fu. 
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VietNam is a symbol of man's faUure to deal with war itself .. -
which, in these times, is the f\mdamental challenge to civilized survival. 
President Johnson, at a recent press conference, expressed this thought in 
a most poignant and personal way when he said: ••I go to bed every night 
feeling that I failed that day because I could not end the conflict in 
Viet Nem. • 
Viet Nam is not, or course, the President's personal failure. 
Rather, it is the faUure of all ot ua. It is the failure of this govern-
ment and of the others that are locked. in the strugsl.e in Viet Ham. It ia 
the failure of the Soviet Union and of China. In the end, Viet Nam is the 
failure of the United Nations because all governments and all people have 
a Vital stake in the restoratien of peace iu Viet Nao. 
The failure in Viet Nam, of which the President speaks, :S.a a. 
tragic failure. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese weu, women and 
children, who are the homeless refugees or accidental casualties of this 
war, beer testimony to that faUure. The Americans who have been maiaed 
in Viet Nam, the families and friends of those who have died in Viet Nam 
know the price of that failure. 
In a stark fashion, Viet Nam dramatizes the gap between the 
reality and the ideal of world brotherhood. It is not only in Viet Nam 
that this ga.p persists. Within this nation it also bas existed between 
the ideal of American life and the great accumulation of neglected 
problems of social order. This gap t.."lree.tened end still threatens the 
stability of American society, particularly in ita great urban centers. 
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During 1966, the nation 1-ras pocklllarked. by out'!:>ursts of severe and violent 
riots in Chicago, 1n Cleveland, in Oan Francisco, in Atlanta, in Oakland. 
Indeed, few maJor cities have been spared these hideouc convulsions. 
In Congressiol':lS.l action during the past few years ve have made 
a beginning in trying to deal vith long neglected social proble.."'lS. Efforts 
have been made and will be made to strengthen the qual1 ty as well as the 
quantity of available police power; to make more Just, as vell as to 1118ke 
more certain, the enforcement of' law. 
And many measures have also been passed in an effort to build 
greater sta.bili ty into the nation by helping the poor, the be.;ildered and 
the alienated of the laDd. There comes readily to mind the National 
Teachers Corps to serve in poverty-stricken areas, the voting rights and 
other laws to bring greater equity of treatment to all races, the city 
demonstration program, aid to Appale.chia., the Manpower Development and 
Training Act, and the M&licare program. 
'l'b.ese and many other social laws eoacted by the recent Con-
gresses have been the acts of sensible political leadership and alert 
government. But they ere also something more. They N'e acts out of 
America •s conscie!lce. They are long-postponed essentie.l. services to 
the well-being of all American• and to the future of this nation. What-
ever shortcomings or excesses are revealed by experience--and I know there 
will be nome~-tb.ey can and will be corrected.. The legislative basis of 
the nation'• social structure will. be improved; it will be strengthened. 
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In the enda.- 1 • • I am confident that this great body of 
legislation will hel;p to make the United States a place 1n which all 
people regardless of individual. differences can find a dignified and 
livable setting for their lives. That is a goal Which expresses the 
ideal of American life but 1 t is also a goal which will strike a respon-
sive cord in every other enl1S}ltened nation. Indeed, it is a goal which 
can be pursued in cOCJmOn with them for the benefit of all the world 'a 
people. 
However broad this concept, the beginnings lie with each of 
us. By what we do and by what we leave undone, each human being has an 
effect on history. Each human being makes a difference, and each is 
responsible for the difference that he makes. In that vein the many 
individuals who over the years have joine4 their efforts in the Conference 
of Christians and Jevs have made a difference in this nation--a construc-
tive difference. In so doing, they have made a difference--a constructive 
difference--in this nation •s relations with other nations. I salute you 
for what you have done and for what you will yet do, for brotherhood, for 
this nation and for peace. 
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BROTJmRHOOD - J.. HUOOE.R IN THE HEART AND IN THE SOUL Sl VISION 
I consider it a signal honor to have been invited to speak to 
you today. For nearly four decades your organization has marched in 
the forward line of the effort to combat religious intolerance and 
racial prejudice. While encouraging the preservation or each religion's 
tenets, you have stood as a symbol of civic cooperation and mutual 
understanding among men. Significantly, you are even nov preparing 
to observe one of your most wll-known and vorthwhile activities -
Brotherhood Week. 
Today I vould like to share vi th you some or rq thoughts on a 
subject, which, as Joseph Auslander stated so vell, elicits "a hunger 
in the heart and in the soul a vision." It is a precept or almost 
every religion - the ideal of brotherhood. 
In \Jest Berlin near the Chauaseestrasse crossing point betveen 
the Eastern and Western sectors of the city stands a statue of two 
men. They lean toward each other, hands outstretched and touching, 
each looking into the other's eye a. The sculptor called his vork 
"Hope tor Reunification," its moat immediate application meaning, of 
course, the longing for reunification ot East and West G9rtna.ey. Yet, 
to me, the statue imparts the universal striving of men as brothers, 
regardless of color or race or religion or nationality. Thus, as men 
recognize the living God as the !'ather of all, so do they also believe 
that the7 are bound to each other. This relationship begins in the 
family, expands through the synagogue or church, through religious 
groups or denominations, transcends national boundaries, and spreads 
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throughout the world. That which is highest in man harbors the hope 
tor reunification with his human brothers. 
let, as we are well aware, men can never be reunified until 
there is ro.ore perfect understanding between all races, creeds, cultures, 
and nations. Until the veils of prejudice, distrust, ignorance, and 
resentment have been swept from his mind and heart, man can never 
achieve his goal of brotherhood. 
It would eeem to me that the increasing interdependence of man 
with man makes it imperative that we begin to lr..1n, the ideal of 
brotherhood, \lhich, simply stated is giving to others the rights 
and respect one wishes for himself. lfuen we survey the two decades 
since the Second World War, we see the direct resul ta of detl11ng 
others respect and human rights. InternAtional crises have all too 
often involved human rights issues, whether religious, ethnic, or 
racial. As our late beloved President, John F. Kennedy, observed, 
peace is "in the last analysis basically a matter of human rights." 
In this age of earlybird satellites and instantaneous communications, 
the world has suddenly become a single city. Our task is to mold it 
into a single community. Toward this goal man has already taken the 
first halting steps. 
The unforgettable and historic visit of Pope Paul VI to the 
United Nations in October 1965, symbolized both the necessity and desire 
of man toward brotherliness . In the space of time or one sunrise 
to the next, l-ope Paul tlew trom the Vatican to ltev York City and 
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back again. From the rostrum ot the univer3al organization he 
admonished, ~~~ you wish to be brothers, let the arms fall from your 
hands. One cannot love whUe holding offensive arms. n After his 
message, the representatives of all members of the United Nations 
paid him the tribute of a standing ovation. 
The journey of Pope I aul also symbolized the increasing tendency 
ot men of religion, whether leaders or laymen, to become involved in 
problems of social conditions and world peace. Voices of the 
religions are heard increasingly - in protest and dissent as well 
as in praise and counsel. The two encyclicals of Pope John XXIII on 
world social and economic condi tiona revealed the commitment of r is 
faith to a more active role in the world. Jewish theologians hnve 
been vigorous advocates of equality and respect for human rights. As 
Dr. Julius Mark ot the Congregation Emanu-EJ. in Nev York City stated, 
". • • the [ ci vll rights J law, to be ertecti ve, JIIIlst not only be 
vritten in a book, rut, to quote the prophet Jeremiah, it tn\l&t be ••• 
written in their hearts." Many clergymen of all tai ths are participating 
in the effort to achieve social justice tor all men. 
Along with concern about civil rights we are witnessing an ever 
increasing effort to foster understanding among different religions. 
Symbolic of this have been meetings between heads of the world's 
religions, for example the discussion between Pope Paul and Patriarch 
• thenagoras I, head of the Eastern Orthodox Church, in Jerwsalem in 
1964. During March 1966, Pope Paul and the Archbishop of Canterblry 
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met in Rome to discuss unity issues. /.nd beginning on January 22 
of this year a Week of Prayer far Christian Unity wu observed, not 
only in the United States but thrOlJ8bout the world. During November 
1966, Francis Cardinal Spellman, 1n a ceremony at Catholic University 
here in Washington, pledged members ot hie church to foster "stronger 
and more extensive bonds of mutual understanding, of respect, and of 
cooperation" with Jewe. 
Thus, particularly in this decade, I would say that we are 
witnessing some marked changes in the attitudes or and relationships 
among the various religions. Century-long tensions are being eased. 
There is a new willingness to live-e.nd-let-live. A greater sense of 
brotherhood and tolerance is evident. There is no diepoaition to make 
sacrifices or adjustments which violate men's religious consciences, 
and that is as it should be. For, as your organization points out, 
brotherhood and cooperation can best be achieved when each man follows 
his religious conviction and allow his brotheT to do likewise. 
On the political world scene, too, man is increaaingly conscious 
of his interdependence with men of other faiths and nationalities. 
For example, in the spirit in which the nuclear test ban treaty of 
1963 waa signed, representatives of sixty nations gathered at the 
White House on January 28 [1967] to sign a treaty barring mUitary 
weapons f'rom outer space. And, earlier 1n the month, in bia State or 
the Union message to Congress, President Johnson reaffirmed his goal of 
building bridges between East and West. On October 7, in Nev York 
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City, the Preaident had declared that, "Cur task is to achieve a 
reconciliation with the East -- a ah1tt from the narrow concept of 
coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement." Coincident 
with this policy, the United States and the Soviet Union have exchanged 
cloud photographs taken from weather satellites and have agreed to 
open direct commercial air nights v1 th each other. The United States 
bas entered into a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union for 
another two years. And the Fresident has urged the Congress to pass 
the F.ast-llest trade bill during this session and to approve the consular 
convention with the Soviet Union. 
In addition to the moves toward reconciliation between East and 
West, the more industrialised n11t!ons are slowly recognising the 
necessity to join together to aid the underdeveloped world. A:s I 
have otten emphasized, the great need is for cooperation vith other 
nations in dealing vi th the underdeveloped lAnds. 'l'hua I have been 
pleased to see the World Bank expanding ita use ot eoDJiortia and 
consultative groups and using them effectively as a basis for common 
discussion among donors and recipients or aid as to bast development 
policies. 
Yet, despite the:se encouraging signs, if one revievs the current 
international situation, he is sobered a.nd grieved by what he seea. 
Darriers of race, religion, and ideology continue to separate man 
trom JDan. It is evident that too rev men believe what Robert Frost 
expressed in hi• poem Mending W•]J a 
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Before I built a w1l I'd ask to know 
\lhat I was walling 1n or valling out, 
And to whom I was like to give offense. 
Something there is that doesn't love a wall, 
D;iat ya.qts it down! 
And no area of the world is free of the valle built by prejudice, 
greed, self-interest, and intolerance. 
/~rica today is in th~ throes of a chaos caused b,y rapid trans-
formation trom traditional to modern society. The struggle tor treedom, 
as we well know from our own national experience, is never harmonious 
or easy. Thus, Africa is rent by tensions resulting tram rapid social 
and economic changes, opposing loyalties to tribe and nation, racial 
difficulties, and the remaining vestiges of colonialism. 
In 1966, Africa continued to be torn by two major problems --
the search for appropriate governmental inatitutio~ and racial tension 
in southermost Africa. In no less than seven countries military 
regimes overthrew and replaced civilian governments. In the area or 
southernmost .~ioa which remains under white rule, racial tensions 
continued to contribute to unrest and instability. Nigeria provided the 
world with a grisly example of the results of unbridled tribal and 
religious tensio!l8. In that nation, where political stability bad seemed 
relatively strong, a military coup in early 1966 was soon followed by 
another. The conflict in Nigeria all but destroyed the national 
army as a unifying force within the country. The Ibo tribe became the 
focus ot great resentment b,y other tribe:J, and hundreds of thousands 
ot Ibos were forced to nee to the safety of the Eastern Region of the 
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country. Thousands were slaughtered by their ovn countrymen 1n the 
cities, villages, and even in the bush. Thus did the walls of religious, 
tribal, and regional hatreds destroy national harmony in Nigeria. 
In the Middle East political tensions continued to prevent the 
realization of peace. In November occurred the most serious mUi tary 
clash between Israel and the Arab nations since 1956. The borders 
betvoen Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan are a perpGtual source 
of contention and unrest. The waters of the Jordan River are an 
increasing point or conflict for the countries of this arid region. 
:.nd of more and more concern today is the threat of an arms race between 
Middle East nations, intensified by' the specter of nuclear proliferation. 
wbile Europe is among the most prosperous and relatively stable 
areas of the world, it continues to face momentous political and social 
p!'Oblems. 'l'be diaangngement of Franoe han the North .-~tlantic Treaty 
Organization vitbin the last year has led to considerable soul-searching 
among the other members. although the nations of Western Europe continue 
to expand contacts with the East Europeans, the Berlin Wall still 
stands as a reminder of the cleft between East and West. The dit:f'ieult 
and intricate problem of a divided Gol'IIIB.ey' remains as the central road-
block to fUrther progress toward a stable peace in t~t region. A key 
to tbe level of tensions at the close or 1966 was the fact that for the 
first time in three years the Berlin ~11 vas closed to Yule visits. 
Woat Berliners were allowed no Christmas passes through the vall to 
visit their relatives in the Eastern part ot the city. 
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Within tha nations of Western Europe uocial tensions contribute' to 
national disharmony. For example, in Belgium, tho language question 
stands as a divisive issue betveen the Prench-epeaking \t.'alloons and their 
Dutch-speaking nemish countrymen. Great Britain is in the midst ot 
exami nil'lg the formidable problema arising f'rOlll the inflow of immigrants 
ham. other parts of tho Commonwealth. ll.nd social tensions resulting 
han the presence of thousands of Algerian refugees continue to trouble 
the French. 
Cur neighbors to the south 1n Latin JDerica are embroiled in 
great and often unsettling change. The economies or all these nations 
are changing, old soc1.al systeu are crumbling, and profound political 
upheavals are taking place. The more than 220 million people of the 
continent are divided by countless religious, language, cultural, and 
ethnic barriers. Most of them live in extreme crippling poverty, 
more intense than we here in ll:merica can imagine. The cbasa between 
the few who "have" and the vast majority who "have notn is almost 
insurmountable. While the United States through the Alliance for 
f rogress program has tried to alleviate some of the sb;ect poverty, 
vo are becoming increasingly aware or the enormit;y or the task before ua. 
In Southern Asia, India and 1 aldstan are still tar f'r011 solving 
the disseneion over Kashmir. The festering b~. tt.ernGso bGtwean them is 
based in part on conflicting territorial claims over Kashmir, 1n part 
on raligioua differences, and in part on old vounds suffered in the 
partitioning of the continent in 1947. "nlroughout the world men had 
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hoped that tho Tashkent Decluation, signed on January 10, 1966, 
vould lead to easing of tension and eventual reconciliation. Yet the 
first anniversary of that declaration passed only veeks ago with an 
exchange of bitter recriminations botveen Indian and Pakistani 
leaders. 
In the Far East the contlict in Vietnam continues to present man 
vith the most troubling international problem of all. The outcome of 
tMt terrible struggle vill be or critical consequence to the entire 
vorld. In a very direct vay Vietnam involves the veil-being of every 
American and the future of the United States. 
Vietnam stands as a great tragedy of mankind. It is a symbol 
of man's failure. For the hundreds or thousands of Vietnamese people 
made homeless by the war, for the families and t'riends of the brave 
men vho have died in that conflict, and for all those deepl)' concerned 
about 1 ta outcome, it dramatizes the chasm between the reall ty and the 
ideal or world brotherhood. We pray that we may soon find a suitable 
solution to that twrible struggle • 
.o:\8 vo all know, our ow homelnnd baa not bem unsullied by social 
tensions. Many of our citizens pass truncated lives, caused by such 
factors as racial discrimination or economic deprivation. Within the 
past few years such problema, having accumulated over a period of 
m&ey' decades, have arisen to challenge the stability of our nation's 
political and social structures . Rioting in our cities, a relatively 
n~v J:roblem, is the extension of the old ills of slums laden with 
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filth, poverty, unemployment, poor housing, inadequate medical 
service, and the heaviness of hopelessnees and despair. During 1966, 
the country vas pockmarked by outbursts of violence -- in Chicago, 
in Cleveland, 1n S:.:.n Francisco, in Atlanta, in Oakland. Few major 
cities have been ~pared the convulsions of social unrest. And vhlle 
we cannot allow acts or violence and lawlessness to continue, neither 
can we allow the conditions which cause them to ~emain. 
It bas been my privilege to be a part of much or the Congressional 
action to correct manJ of ~erica's social inequities. During the last 
two years the Eighty-Uinth Congress, sometimes called the Great Congress, 
or the Congress with a Social Conscience, has passed ~ measures 
designed to help the poor and alienated or our land. For example, 
it established and appropriated funds for the National Teachers Corps 
to serve in poTerty-stricken areas. It enacted the most comprehensive 
voting rights law to receive Congressional approval 1n ninety-five 
years. It established a nev city demonstration program of Federal 
grants and technical assistance to help cities remove areas ot slUlll 
and blight. It authorized $1.1 billion in aid to Appalachia to revive 
the econOJJJy of that area and to improve the skills and health or its 
people. It extended the Manpower Development and Training Act to 
June 30, 1969, and provided needed flexibility to permit more effect ive 
means of' coping with t he problems of' the disadvantaged and hard-core 
unemployed. 
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These, then, were a fev of tho moasurea passed by Congre:ls to try 
to equalize freedom of opportunity tor all our citizens. Its mission 
the 
was to make this nation a better place in which to live and, to/extent 
posaible, to contribute to the malting of a better vorld. 
For you gathered here, and for many Americans and many people 
throughout the world, that goal ot a better wrld 1s theirs also. 
In order to attain 1 t we lJIUSt move with dignity" but without surcease 
against the barriers of human 1nequ.el.ity. Even though we &re sombered 
and otten discouraged by the lack of brotherly feeling among men, the 
ideal ot brotherhood is our onl7 hopo. To attain that goal, we must 
see that no outdaUMl myth or ancient hatred lies une:mmined. We must 
neglect no opportunity in the slov pa1natek1ng search for peace. 
Let me say once more th&t we must not allov the lodestar of 
brotherhood to fade, regardless of the chasm betveen reality and our 
aspirations. And, as your organization has stressed time and again, 
w must never lose sight of the importance ot each individual upon 
this mighty cause. For by vhat we do and by \lhat vo leave undone, 
each has a genuine effect upon history. EUch man makes a difference, 
and each is responsible tor the dirterence t~t he makes. 
Under the guidance of God ve must persist in our quest for the 
interests vhich unite nations, for the policies which bind them together, 
for the institutions which transcend rival national interests, and !or 
the international inst.rumfmts or law and security. This great under-
taking requires patience and fortitude, tor it v111 not be quickly 
realized. It requires courage, f'or it is a difficult, even lonely, 
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search. It requires a higher human thinking and action tor it 
must beoane tha guiding principle of otu" dally lives. 
Hence is tho great teak before us -- the reunification of man 
vi th his fellOlii!Wl. Cur mainstay 1n this magnificent venture is the 
Father of us all, the living God . For He is the solo source of . the 
ansvere to the questions which have plagued man since the beginning 
of time. Truly has ho been our help in ages past. He remains O'lll" 
strength and our hope for the reunion of man with Dl&ll. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 74, Folder 3, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
( 
ADDRESS BY SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. 1 MONTANA) 
Before the 
Carolina Forum, The Univer sity of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 
Monday, March 13, 1967 
8:00p.m. (Egr) 
CEN!'RAL CONCERNS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Prior to my coming to Congress a quarter of a century ago, I 
thought my stock of solutions to the questions of foreign policy was 
quite adequate. In fact, as a teacher of history at the University of 
Montana, which I was, I had a touch of what Senator Fulbright might call 
the arrogance of brain power. In more common idiom, there were times 
when I thought I knew it all . That, may I say, is a failing common to 
exceptional historians, from Herodotus to Schlessinger. 
As a new Member of Congress, my background in history was highly 
useful . I also discovered, however, that my knowledge of international 
affairs did not go very far. It did not begin to provide much of an under-
standing, let alone answers, to the critical issues which were emerging 
as World War II drew to a close. In those days, most of us in government 
suffered from serious imperfections in our notions of the outside world 
and widely-held but unfounded hopes for an automatic postwar peace under 
the United Nations. 
We took many wrong te.cks- along with the right ones in the course 
of our foreign policy. For many decades to come, historians will be en-
gaged in sorting out the one from the other. \ve made mistakes in Asia. 
We made them in Europe . We made them in the United Nations • We made them 
over the whole range of emerging new international issues. 
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I, for one, felt my limitations and recognized the need to 
become a student again. My classroom was Congress, in Committee and on 
the floor. My extracurricular activity included a great deal of foreign 
travel, extensive reading and not a little reflection. 
To this day, a student I have remained; an expert I am not; and 
teaching is the profession to which, at some point, I may return. In the 
latter connection, I should note that my name is still carried, on leave 
of absence, on the roster of the University of Montana. Moreover, thanks 
to a seniority system in college teaching, second not even to that of the 
Congress 1 I now hold the rank of full Professor of History. 
I am constrained to point out that teaching and legislating are 
the two outstanding examples in American society of the application of a 
major tenet of Confucianism: that the accumulation of years is to be 
equated automatically and unquestioningly with the accumulation of wisdom. 
This principle, I know, is insufferable to the young, tolerable to the 
middle-aged, and a comfort to those full of years. At this point in time, 
I must confess that I find a system of seniority tolerably comfortable. 
For the present, I have no hesitancy in invoking the authority 
with which seniority endows me, in order that I may speak to you on what 
seems to me to be the central concerns of contemporary American foreign 
policy. Since the end of World War II, I have watched clusters of inter-
national problems coalesce into these concerns. The problems cover a 
whole range of new and tumultuous change. They are, in part, ironic by-
products of the immense acceleration of development in science, education 
and communication, transportation and other technologies. They are ex-
pressive of the explosion in population as well as the explosion of nuclear 
devices. They are indicative of the growth of human expectations and, 
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hopefully, of human enlightenment. They are problems, however, which 
despite these new twists, are still undergirded by the vast heritage of 
human ignorance, fear, want, and hostility from which no part of the 
globe is free. 
The iceberg of change which has moved in international affairs 
during the past two decades helps to explain the emergence of the U.N. 
and other international organizations. It is relevant to the social in-
stability and the militarism which have largely followed the ending of 
19th century colonial era, notably in Africa. It is involved in the 
Asian catacylsms--the great economic stirrings in Japan, the immense un-
certainties which brood over India and Pakistan and the political tidal 
waves which, at intervals, have rolled through Chinese society . 
The many-sided changes in the human condition during the past 
two decades also explain the first military alliance in peacetime between 
ourselves and Western Europe as well as the first major military involve-
ments of the United States on the Asian mainland . They help to explain, 
finally, the awakening of this nation to the problems which confront the 
world and ourselves as participants in its indivisible destiny. 
It used to be that we tended to stand apart and aloof from the 
affairs of the rest of the globe. Some have called that period of our 
history which led up to \.J'orld \.J'ar II, the age of isolation. The charac-
terization is glib and somewhat misleading. :·le were not so much isolated 
as we were insulated by a fortuitous geographic endowment . The greater 
part of the nation's historic energies, therefore, could, and, fortunately 
did, go inward into the development of a rich, ample, and sparsely settled 
land. :le had little need or inclination which would stimulate us to 
look much beyond this endowment for our needs and--if I may use the term--
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f or our kicks . Except to sustain a l:im~L ted cu.riosi ty and to satisfy a 
few exotic wants , we avo:i.ded an exter.swe overseas projection of Amer ican 
power, particularly ou-:. s ide the vleste:::-n Hemisphere . From a distance, we 
were content to hold oux·selves up to the rest of the world, on the basis 
of great material achicvcreents and the polit ical he~itage of the American 
Revol ution, as a prime exampl e of the p8rfect ability of the national ex-
per ience . 
Since World '.far II, ho;rever, we have found. ourselves plunged, 
hands, feet , ani head into the maj.nstream of the world ' s affairs. He 
did not seek this role . Ue did not \-rant it . Most of us still find the 
clothes of a great international power, costly, ill-fitting and uncom-
fortable . Nevertheless , we are unable to get out of them . There is even 
the probability that some of us have lea~ned not only to tolerate this new 
garb, but to like it . 
In any event, as a sequel to \.forld \.far II, this nation has come 
onto the center of the stage of interna tional affairs . In this leading 
role we have expended an immense amount of resources , energy, and money 
for a great variety of purposes . l.fe have developed all manner of costly 
intelligence and informational ser vices . Vle he.ve developed towering 
military services whose annual cost is novT around $70 billion. 
liTe have foug.-,_t one war in Asia, and are now engaged in a second . 
We have narrovTly missed involvement in several other peripher al clashes 
elsewhere . More than twenty years after \-lorld War II, we still have some-
t hing on the order of agreements for mutual security vTith 40 or more 
nations . These ag:r:eements, in effect, are commitments to military action 
everywher e on the globe, except, perhaps, the Antarctic . The str ategi c 
air for ce is on a minutes- aler t . Inter continental and other missiles are 
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pre-set for instant retaliatory launching. Day and night the American 
navy patr ols the seven seas . American soldiers are stationed in many 
.lations abroad; in Europe and Viet Nam, they number in the hundreds of 
thousands . 
These far-flung commitments have been questioned from time to 
time . In my judgment, it is most proper that pertinent questions be 
raised about them . Not only do they involve great expenditures of public 
funds, they carry, at all times, immense implications for the very survival 
of the nation and civilization. As I see it, we have undertaken so many 
and scattered defense obligations that any need for the simultaneous honor-
ing of a group of these commitments would find us hard-pressed to provide 
even a limited response. For that reason, if for no other, it seems to 
me we would be well-advised to look closely at these military commitments 
and activities and to weigh carefully their contemporary value . 
It would be futile, however, to consider them in a vacuum. 
Effective surveillance must relate to the central concerns of our foreign 
policy which, presumably, gave rise to them in the first place . It be-
hooves us to see as clearly as possible whether our understanding of these 
concerns is up to date. It is incumbent upon us to test and test again 
the reflexes of our policies not only for adequacy but for excess. 
It will serve no useful purpose to continue to measure these 
reflexes of policy by the sort of generalities which are expressed by the 
terms "isolationism" or "internationalism." Hhatever may have been the 
case years ago, these yardsticks have long since lost their pertinence. 
The labels are no guarantee of the efficacy of any course of action or 
non-action in international relations . ~ihat is essential is not the name. 
What is essential is that the course is timely and adjusts the bonafide 
interests of the nation to the realities of the contemporary world. 
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I speak in all candor when I say that there have been tendencies 
under both Democratic and Republican administrations for foreign policy to 
lag behind these realities. Until recently, a kind of inertia, for ex-
ample, has existed with regard to one of the central concerns of American 
foreign policy--the United States-Soviet confrontation in Europe. Until 
recently, we have been most reluctant to bring ourselves to face, in policy, 
the changes which have taken place on that continent. 
To be sure, President Eisenhower sought in his administration to 
restore at least a me;;, sure of civility in the conduct of U.S.-Soviet affairs, 
by hie personal associations with the leaders of the Soviet Union. To be 
sure, President Kennedy, in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, removed a rigidity 
which, for years had decreed that agreements should not be concluded with 
the Soviet Union. It has only been in the last year or two, however, that 
as a nation we have begun to explo~e fully the implications of change in 
Europe and to react to its potentialities in terms of our interests and 
world peace. 
Yet substantial change has been manifest for some time in inner 
developments in both Eastern Europe and in \>!estern Europe and between the 
two regions . In Eastern Europe, the immediate postwar isolation from the 
West "Vras a severe one . It was compounded of political and war-born 
vendettas, ideological parochialisms, reciporcal fears and the in-turning 
of human energy to meet the massive demands of post-war reconstruction. 
Especially since the death of Stalin, however, there has been a general 
loosening of the ideological and other straight-jackets throughout Eastern 
Europe. There has also been a growing response on the part of governments 
there to consumer needs, the satisfaction of which involves greatly ex-
panded commerce with the non-Communist world. 
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As indicative of the breadth of change, communications, travel, 
cultural exchange and other contacts have grown r apidly between Eastern 
and Western Europe. The rise of t r ade levels between the two regions has 
been very pr onounced, and it should be noted that, Berlin Wall notwith-
standing, vlest Germany leads all other non-Communist nations in commerce 
with Eastern Europe . 
For those \-tho read the tea leaves of official sociability, more-
over, I would call attention to the recent visits of President Podgorny of 
the Soviet Union to Italy and the first reception of a Chief of that State 
by the Pope, as well as Premier Kosygin's warm receptions in Paris and 
London. One may attach such values as he chooses to these events . The 
facts of change in Europe, however, speak for themselves. The talk of 
war subsides; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard more 
clearly on all sides. The European detente has not only begun, it is 
already well-advanced. 
Our reaction to change in Europe includes the groundwork of 
President Eisenhower and President Kennedy as well as the bridge-building 
of President Johnson, all of which I have already mentioned. 
\Jhat is involved in the latter case is a sustained effort in 
the direction of restoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet 
Union and a significant reduction in the military rivalry which, wittingly 
or unwittingly, could lead to a catastrophic conflict . 
A number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are 
already involved in this effort . They deal with cultural exchanges, 
consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer 
space . Negotiations are also anticipated, in the near future, to try to 
limit the incredibly costly rivalry of adding successive and reciprocal 
"antis" to the ballistic missile systems of each nation . An attempt is 
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also likely to be made to remove certain long-standing and self-imposed 
hindrances in law to our peaceful trade with the Eastern European countries. 
Many of these measures, of course, involve not only the President 
but also action by the Congress and, particularly, by the Senate. And, 
certainly, they involve understanding on the part of the people of the 
nation. However, emotions run deep on any question of U.S. relations with 
Communist nations, particularly, in the light of the bloody conflict in 
Viet Nam. I am frank to say that I have my own reticences about the pursuit 
of agreements with nations on one side of the globe, while a war against us 
is being waged with their help on the other. The best judgments we can 
obtain, however, tell us that the rejection of the contemplated agreements 
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will not make the slightest dif-
ference in the situation in Viet Nam. It will, in no way, diminish our 
casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict . 
In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our purposes 
to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be in the interest 
of this nation . I do not see that we advance the cause of peace by re-
fusing to build more stable relations for peace whenever and wherever an 
opportunity to do so presents itself. 
Moreover , bridge-building to Eastern Europe is not unrelated to 
the possibility of making constructive changes in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, changes which would also serve the nation ' s interests. For 
many years, six divisions of American forces have been consigned to N.A.T .O. 
in Western Europe . These forces and their dependents involve a U.S. mili-
tary establishment in Hestern Europe of well over half a million Americans. 
It is an undertaking which represents an expenditure of billions of dollars 
of public funds each year. Yet, I would not begrudge one cent of these 
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funds if I were persuaded that the six divisions were as essential to peace 
in Europe, today, as they were believed to be when dispatched there years 
ago. 
But is that the case? I have already mentioned the change in the 
general climate in Europe which expresses itself in a rapidly growing trade 
ao:lthe expansion of other friendly relations. It should also be noted that 
within Western Europe, there are obvious doubts about the need for the 
maintenance of N.A.T.O. at the strength in which it was previously projected. 
Indeed, the French no longer see any requirement for the presence of U.S. 
forces, at least not in France, and they have withdrawn their own detach-
ments from N.A.T.O. Command. The United Kingdom has reduced its commitment 
of men and resources to the Continent and has announced further reductions 
unless West Germany is prepared to neutralize the exchange costs of main-
taining these forces on the Rhine. Other Western Europeans to a greater 
or lesser degree appear to regard their N.A.T.O. commitments in the same 
non-urgent fashion. 
It is now very evident that the United States alone has felt 
deeply the need to sustain the full military burden of the earlier common 
commitment to N .A.T .0. Our allies in \vestern Europe are much closer to 
the firing line; yet, in a period of unprecedented economic prosperity they 
are most unwilling to carry their pledged share. In effect, the Hestern 
Europeans have made adjustments in their commitments to N.A.T.O. to reflect 
over-all changes in Europe and they have made these adjustments unilaterally. 
The contrast in performance between ourselves and \vestern Europe 
regarding commitments to N.A.T.O. in my judgment, is becoming almost an 
embarrassment. It moves us apart from the mainstream of European develop-
ments and is likely to become a source of friction on both sides which, in 
the end, can only be harmful to the interests of both sides. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 74, Folder 3, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 10 -
In all frankness, I find it difficult to acquiesce in Executive 
Branch fears for Western Europe's safety which are obviously far greater 
than the fear of the Europeans themselves. In all frankness, I find some 
lack of dignity in the lengths to which these fears have carried our 
diplomacy . We have begged, badgered and buttered Western Europe in an 
effort to stimulate a greater contribution to N.A .T.O. In all frankness, 
I did not relish this nation having been placed in the position of wearing 
out its welcome in France. I should not like to see that experience re-
peated elsewhere in Europe . Yet it may well be repeated unless there is 
a willingness to make timely adjustments. 
I have, therefore, joined with 43 other Senators in the introduc-
tion of a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive 
Branch make substantial reductions in the present deployment of our forces 
in Western Europe. Personally, I have felt for several years that two or 
three rather than six divisions would be more than sufficient to underscore 
our adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty . That figure is in line with 
estimates of present need which have been advanced by General Eisenhower 
and General Gavin, both of whom have had a long association with this 
question. I find it most difficult to comprehend why two divisions are any 
less effective than six in serving notice that we regard the pledge of the 
North Atlantic Treaty as binding and our national security as inseparable 
from that of the North Atlantic region. To talk of six divisions as a 
manifestation of international resolution and two divisions as an indication 
of a revived isolationism is to reveal how irrelevant if not downright mis-
leading these terms have become . 
On the other side of the globe, in Asia, there looms another 
central concern of American foreign policy. It is the confrontation with 
China, across the littoral states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam. 
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Almost two decades have passed since the collapse of the national 
government on the Chinese mainland and its retreat to the island of Taiwan. 
That event, which occurred when most of you were too young for it to be 
noticed, was catac.lysmic in its consequences. It sundered the fabric of 
Chinese society and, almost overnight, brought about the disintegration of 
a main pillar of postwar American foreign policy. In the rubble, the watch-
word became "wait for the dust to settle" before doing anything about China. 
Over the years, the cut-off of contact between ourselves and the 
Chinese mainland has become, for all practical purposes, total . Americans 
do not go there . Mainland Chinese do not come here. There is not only an 
absence of personal contact, there is also a complete absence of trade and 
communications . Indeed, of all the nations of the world we alone have not 
only maintained a primary boycott for many years but also seek to enforce 
a secondary boycott on Chinese exports . 
He have had brief confrontations w1 th Chinese spokesmen on various 
issues over the years, notably at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962. 
Our sol e continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking government, however, 
has been the meetings between the u. s. and Chinese Ambassadors in Poland 
which have gone on regularly for many years and at which no business of 
significance, so far as I am aware, has been conducted. 
In short, "waiting for the dust to settle, " has remained the 
watchword of this nation ' s relations with three-quarters of a billion 
Chinese through the administrations of three Presidents . In truth, the 
dust has not settled. The initial hostility between a revolutionary China 
for which we had had little sympathy and ourselves was followed almost 
immediately by the Korean Conflict in which we became directly engaged in 
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military conflict with the Chinese . Thereafter came the near conflict at 
the islands ~f Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits. And now, there is 
again conflict, this time, by proxy in Viet Nam. 
Hithin China, during these years there have been momentous events 
which have also added to the difficulties and uncertainties of devel oping 
a cohesive policy towards the Chinese mainland. The Chinese have exploded 
nucl ear devices at Lop Nor in the Hestern Asian desert of Sinkiang. Recent 
ideological conflicts have sent great tremors through the whole of the inner 
political structure of China. There has been, finally, the great cleavage 
in Sino-Soviet revolutionary solidarity which has torn apart almost all of 
the relationships between the two giantnations of the F.urasian Continent. 
In the context of these events , it is not surprising that the dust, 
for the settlement of which American policy has waited eighteen years , is 
heavier than ever. The obscurity, moreover , is not likely to be dispelled 
in the near future . There is nothing in the recent history of China which 
suggests that it wil.l be easier tomorrow than it is today for us to see 
clearly a direction for effective policy . \·lhatever course of .1\merican rela-
tions with China, it will have to be pursued in spite of the dust with which 
the situation is covered. 
Clear-cut choices cannot be expected to be available to us any 
time in the foreseeable future . On the contrary, American decisions respect-
ing China must inevitably contain a large measure of subjectivity and prayer. 
Ever-present, will be the possibility of error . These considerations, may 
I say, apply not only to what we may do respecting China but to what we do 
not do . The uncertainties and the risks exist no less in the principle of 
of non-approach to which we have adhered over these years of our times . 
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History will someday estimate the contribution of this principle--its addition 
to or subtraction from the interests of the United States and the stability 
and peace of the Hestern Pacific. 
Under the present approach, for exampl e, we know from a distance 
that a great fire rages in the core of Chinese Communism. The manifestations 
are plain in the roars of the Red Guards, in the denunciations and counter-
denunciations, in the sudden fall of l ong-established revol utionaries . They 
are documented in the inflamatory ideographs which are slashed over the 
streets and walls of Peking and the other citadels of Chinese Communist power. 
They are suggested in the political bewilderment which is seen in coastal 
cities and in the provinces along the inner borders of China and other remote 
areas . 
Indeed, the present turmoil , is such as to make clear that Communist 
political control which, for nearly two decades, was held by many to be total 
and irreversible and to extend all the way from Moscow to the farthest reaches 
of China is actually considerably less than absolute, even in its extension 
from Peking to the distant Chinese provinces . 
He can al so note, from afar, the serious difficulties between the 
Soviet Union and China . The strains have long been explicit in the ideologi-
cal realm. They have al so become increasingly evident in the tension along 
the Sino-Soviet frontier which runs for thousands of miles between the two 
countries. lihat appears involved here is an expression of the historic pro-
jection of Czarist Russian interests across the Asian mainland towards 
Alaska and which, before it receded to more tractable limits, had spread 
even as far as California and Hawaii. This basic Russian projection to the 
East persists and rubs against China, at least in border regions of Manchuria, 
l 
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Mongolia, and in Sinkiang Province . Conversely, an historic Chinese interest 
remains in many parts of Soviet Asia which at vari ous times have been under 
at ~east nominal Chinese authority. The clash of national interests of the 
two nations, in short, is ver y r eal and so, too, are the irredentist hostili-
ties which it engenders. 
These hostilities have been a major element in the cycle of ever-
increasing bitter ness in Chinese-Soviet r el ations over the past few years . 
How long this cycle will last and how it will end are matters of conjecture . 
Whatever the possibilities, if any, of more effective adjustment of our 
policies in the light of this and other trends, however, we are inhi bited 
from their pursuit by our current approach or, rather , non-approach to 
mainland China. 
Let me turn, finally, to the immediate and over-riding problem of 
policy, to the situation in Viet Nam. Viet Nam affects every other aspect 
of our foreign relations and, particularly, the two central concerns. It 
diminishes our capacity to deal constructively with the United States-Soviet 
confrontation in Europe . To put it mildly, it multiplies the problems of 
the confrontation with China in Asia. 
It is ironic that once again in Viet Nam, as in Korea, a country 
so small and remote from our interests as to be outside the range of even 
public curiosity a few years ago has become the major preoccupation of the 
United States . It is ironic that, for the second time in a generation, we 
find ourselves in a devastating war on the borders of China--not with China--
but with a people who have had no tradition of hostility towards the United 
States and who have far more historic r eason than do we for mutual hostility 
with the Chinese. 
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How deeply we are engaged in this ironic situation is indicated 
by the current concentration of United States military force in Southeast 
Asia and, particularly, in Viet Nam. We have well in excess of 4oo,ooo 
military personnel on the ground in South Viet Nam. There are also approxi-
mately 75,000 men on the 7th Fleet in adjacent waters and 35,000 more in 
Thailand with responsibilities that are tied closely into the situation in 
VietNam. In short, we have committed to this conflict over 500,000 members 
of the Armed Services and materiel and equipment in unprecedented quantities 
and this immense consignment is supported by additional military strength 
of all kinds on Okinawa, the Philippines, and Guam. 
He are in a limited war in which, by becoming deeply engaged, we 
have managed to save from collapse the government of South Viet Nam in Saigon. 
The objectives of our military engagement are confined entirely to the 
southern half of Viet Nam. This limited war of limited objectives, never-
theless, has already engaged more American forces than Korea. It has cost 
more than Korea. It has incurred plane and helicopter losses greatly in 
excess of those in Korea. It is a more difficult and dangerous war than 
Korea. It is a more bitter and barbaric war. It is a war whose end is not 
yet in sight, by military action or by a negotiated diplomatic solution. 
That is the reality of the situation in VietNam. The more can-
didly it is faced the better off we will be. At this point, the question 
of how or why we became involved is moot and so are regrets over our involve-
ment. In my judgment, the question now is how can this war be ended at the 
soonest possible moment in an honorable peace for ourselves and for all 
deeply enmeshed in it. In short, the question is how can it be ended under 
honorable circumstances, before the spreading devastation, not only in North 
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Viet Nam, but even more, in South Viet Nam, makes a hideous mockery of the 
original objective of helping the Vietnamese people. 
I do not believe that we can end this war by slogans of "get in or 
get out. " It cannot be ended by personal criticism of the President and 
the Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and other leaders of the Administra-
tion or members of the Senate, regardless of the positions 1(hich they take 
on this issue. I am frank to say that this criticism, at times, goes far 
beyond the merely ungracious and borders on the disgraceful. President 
Johnson wants this war ended in an honorable peace and every Senator I know, 
and I know them all, wants the same thing. If there are differences among 
us they are differences of understanding, interpretation, and method. 
In my personal view, and I have made it clear many times, the 
conflict cannot be terminated in an honorable fashion by a withdrawal of 
the United States at this time although an honorable settlement must even-
tually involve the withdrawal of United States forces. 
The only practical avenue which I see open, for the present, is 
to seek to mitigate the horror of the conflict and to restrain its spread, 
while endeavoring to pursue any avenue, byway, route or whatever, as the 
President has sought to do, which might lead to the negotiating table. That 
there has not yet been an initiation of substantial contact for peace is no 
argument against the continuance of the effort to make that contact. There 
can be no relaxation until the war is brought to an end in negotiations. 
It is essential that we pursue peace in Viet Nam in all sincerity and with 
all diligence not only because, in this situation, peace has a rational and 
moral validity, but also because a prompt settlement is in the interests of 
the Vietnamese people and the interests of the American people . 
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I must say, with great regret, that signs of a settlement in the 
near future are lacking. There is, instead, the fact of an ugly war of 
spreading devastation. All the while, the options are running out; the 
alternatives which might lead to negotiations grow fewer. 
Many proposals have been put forth and many have been explored. 
As an example, over the past year or more I have publicly called attention 
to these possible easements of the situation and for eventual settlement: 
1. In lieu of aerial bombardment of North Viet Nam, 
the sealing off of the borders of the 17th parallel, 
through Laos; 
2. A reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis 
of the 1954 and 1962 agreements by call of the co-
chairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, 
or by any participating conferees; 
3. An all-Asian conference at Rangoon or Tokyo or any 
other suitabl e location to consider the conditions 
of an honorable peace; 
4. The inclusion in any peace conference of whatever 
belligerents may be necessary to bring about a 
termination of the conflict in Viet l'Jam; 
5· An enlargement of the Manila Conference of 1966 into 
a follow-up conference, to include friend and foe alike; 
6 . A face - to-face meeting of the Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk, and the Foreign Minister of the Peking government 
to discuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam. 
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In additi0n, I have urged that the closest consideration be given 
to informed French views on Viet Nam and to the views of the Cambodian 
Premier, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. I have urged that the proposals of U Thant 
and Mrs . Gandhi be considered. I have endorsed various statements of the 
President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all of which have made 
ciear that not only our proposals but also those of Hanoi and the People ' s 
Liberation Front might provide a basis for settlement. I have recommended 
that there be not just a cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam but 
that all killing stop, on both sides, in a cease-fire and standfast, on 
the ground and in the waters adjacent to Viet Nam as well as over Viet Nam, 
to the end that efforts may be made to initiate talks . 
In some of these proposals, the President has concurred and has 
had them pursued by his diplomats . All of them, he has had examined and 
if they have not been pursued, I can only conclude that there have been 
sound reasons for not pursuing them. Suggestions for peace have come from 
many sources; the actual pursuit of peace in the past year, however, has 
been by diplomacy and, largely, by secret diplomacy. Indeed, that is the 
case even with the efforts of the distinguished Secretary General of the 
United Pations , U Thant . In his attempt s to bring about peace in Viet Nam, 
U Thant has acted in his personal and diplomatic capacity rather than in his 
Secretarial capacity of carrying out organizational decisions of the United 
Nations . 
The fact is that the u. N., as an organization, has not yet 
entered into the Vietnamese problem. Some limited useoof the u. N. in this 
fashion, may I say, was proposed in an address which I delivered at Johns 
Hopkins University in November , 1966. At the time, it was not suggested 
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that the United Nations be brought directly into the substance of the dispute; 
that course presents great difficulties because neither North Viet Nam nor 
China are member states. Hhat I did suggest, however, was an entirely 
proper and precedented procedural initiative by the United Nations. The 
Security Council can issue, at any time, by majority vote a call to all 
belligerents in Viet Nam to convene in its forum. It would be entirely in 
order for an invitation of this kind to include both China and North Viet Nam 
It was further 8 uggested last November that a basis for a negoti-
ated settlement could begin to be sought in a Security Council request to 
the International Court for an advisory opinion on the applicability of the 
Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. I am delighted to note, in passing, that 
Congress only last week expressed its overwhelming formal endorsement of 
these agreements as a basis for a negotiated settlement. 
I betray no confidences when I note that, on request, I interrupted 
a brief vacation last fall to go to New York for the sole purpose of discuss-
ing these two proposals regarding the possible usage of the u. N. organizatio: 
with Ambassador Goldberg and the Secretary-General. On the basis of these 
discussions it seemed preferable at the time that the search for peace then 
being actively pursued be continued via the private avenues of diplomacy 
rather than in the forum of the Security Council. 
That was many weeks and months ago. In the interim, intense and 
many-sided efforts of diplomacy have been exerted through many private 
channels to find the key to peace. Hopes rose during the cease-fires at 
the Christmas holidays and at Tet, the Oriental New Year. However, in the 
end, diplomacy not only was unable to find a road to negotiations, it was not 
able even to bring about an extension of these truces. 
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The Pope tried. The Russian and British leaders have tried. The 
Secretary-General of the u. N., in his diplomatic capacity, has tried. 
Ambassador Goldberg has tried countless times. Many other dipl omats and 
officials of the Executive Branch of the government have tried. 
The strenuous efforts of traditional diplomacy have been unavail-
ing. As indicated by recent statements of both Ambassador Goldberg and 
U Thant, the slender reed of hope has shriveled. There is now no immediate 
prospect on the horizon, except for the intensification of the conflict . 
That, indeed, is already in progress . The casualties increase; the devasta-
tion grows; the dangers of expanded war mul tiply. 
In the circumstances, it seems to me that a contribution to peace 
might well be sought in public from the United Nations as an organization . 
The Secretary-General' s personal efforts to date have been dedicated and 
strenuous and be is entitled to the gratitude and support of the entire 
world community. With all due respect, however, there are other resources 
for peace inherent in the Uni ted Nations, as an organization, which have 
gone untapped and untried. The U. N. does have a responsibility to try to 
contribute to the resolution of this conflict. That responsibility is 
explicit in the Charter and every member nation, including ourselves, 
shares that responsibility by solemn Treaty obligation. 
It seems to me that the cause of a peaceful and honorabl e settle-
ment may possibly be advanced--certainly it cannot be hurt--by modest recourse 
at this time to the procedural machinery of the United Nations . In my judg-
ment, this nation should consider seeking a face - to-face confrontation of 
all belligerents at the United Nations . Following the Korean precedents, 
it seems to me eminently desirable that this government give every considera-
tion to a possible initiative which would bring to a vote in the Security 
Council two resolutions along the following lines: 
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One, that the Security Council invite all belligerents, direct 
and indirect, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate in an 
open discussion of the conflict in Viet Nam and ways and means of ending 
it; 
Two, that the Security Council request the International Court 
to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability of the Geneva 
Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may 
place on the present belligerents in Viet Nam. 
lVhether or not there is much prospect of a positive response from 
others in no way lessens the desirability of offering these resolutions in 
good faith and bringing them to a vote. In my judgment, an American initia-
tive of this kind serves not only our interests but the interests of peace 
in Viet Nam. 
Let me conclude, now, by clarifying one point: the conflict in 
VietNam cannot be settled from the Congress or from the campus. In the 
end, if it is to be settled honorably, there is only one Constitutional 
officer of your government who can speak for you and for the entire nation 
in its foreign relations. IVhether we agree with him or not, whether we like 
him or not, whether we abhor him or lo¥e him, that man is the President of 
the United States. 
In a government such as ours, a Senator lives with a Constitution, 
a constituency, and a conscience. All three considerations underlie the 
suggestions respecting Viet Nam which have been made here today and others 
which have been expressed on other occasions. President Johnson and all 
the Presidents who have gone before him have listened to advice from many 
sources, including the Senate. 
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It is the President, however, who makes the fundamental decisions 
of foreign policy . These decisions are of an immensity which enjoins upon 
us all a high respect for the burdens which a President must bear and a 
responsibility to tender to him every support which can be given in good 
conscience. In the end, these decisions will determine--insofar as it lies 
with this nation to determine--the moment of peace in Viet Nam and Asia. 
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REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MON.r.ANA) 
THE KOBLITZ MEMORIAL ~TURE 
The Temp~e 
Sunday Morning, April 30, 1967 
Cleveland, Ohio 
CRITICAL CCMFONENTS OF CURREN.r U. S. FOREIGN POLICY 
Along with rabbis, ministers and priests, a member of the Senate 
is among those most acutely aware of the great range of problems which face 
the nation and give rise to its principal anxieties. Both in domestic and 
international matters, Senators are compelled by their responsib~ ties to 
chart a course through a maze of disturbing public issues. 
A Senator's guide in this process is a kind of triangle . At the 
base is the United States Constitution. One of the sides is his constituency, 
the other his conscience. For each Senator, the three angles are adjusted 
differently. During any session of Congress, however, all Senators are 
confronted with the need to make decisions which, in the end, are enclosed 
in this triangle . 
A Senator's duties also have a tripartite character. They involve 
a contribution to a responsive Congress in a government which is responsive 
to domestic needs and which governs our relationship with the rest of the 
world by means of a responsive foreign policy. Three of the Senate's 
actions during this session of the Congress are illustrative. 
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The Legislative Reorganization Act of l967, which recently passed 
the Senate, points the way to the first major updating of Congressional 
procedures in two decades . The revision and extension of the Appalachian 
Act which the Senate approved a few days ago is a response to the current 
needs of a multi-state region left stranded by the shifting tides of economic 
development. Senate consent to ratification of a Consular Treaty with the 
Soviet Union is a response to the President's effort to bring about better 
relations not only with that nation but with all of Eastern Europe . 
These three measures share a common characteristic . In their 
intent, all seek to keep pace with change. It is to the factor of change--
to changes in the international situation-- that I would first address your 
attention. In the two decades since World War II, we have seen a drastic 
revision in the political composition of continents . We have witnessed 
the emergence and growth of the United Nations and other international 
groupings of nations. We have been almost overwhelmed by a mass outpouring 
of developments in science and technology. We have been present at the 
addition of the nth power of nuclear weapons to the already complicated 
equations upon which rest world peace and civilized survival. We have been 
compelled to face the frightful gaps in the material well-being of the 
world's peoples and to confront the dilemmas which the rapid growth of 
population poses to efforts to close these gaps. 
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The extent of change over the past two decades is also suggested 
in the contrast of the haunted, war-ravaged Europe of 1946 and the glittering, 
assertive Europe of 1967. It is sensed in the strivings for human betterment 
throughout Latin America and Africa and in other underdeveloped regions. In 
Asia, the force of change is illuminated by the extraordinary recovery and 
the technological advance of Japan. It is felt in the vast tremors in 
Chinese society. 
It used to be that we were so immersed in change within our own 
nation that our concern for change beyond our borders was minimal. Some 
speak of that not so distant time as an age of isolationism. Actually, we 
were not so much isolated as we were insulated in a much less complicated 
world by an exhilarating national experience and by a fortuitous geography. 
Our energies, fortunately, could be directed largely to the inner develop-
ment of a nation which was as sparsely settled as it was plentifully endowed. 
There was little need for us to look elsewhere for our challenges. The 
changing American frontier --physical, scientific and economic--was as 
stimulating and as promising of personal fulfillment as any in the world. 
Except to indulge a limited curiosity and to cater to a few exotic wants, 
we were inclined to avoid an extensive overseas projection of American 
power. 
We did not seek our present involvement in world affairs. Even 
on the eve of Pearl Harbor, as a nation, we were reluctant to accept it. 
Yet, as a sequel to World War II, we became deeply and irrevocably immersed 
in the affairs of the rest of the world. 
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During the past two decades, we have directed tremendous resources, 
human energy and nationaJ. power into a multitude of activities abroad. The 
cost of aid programs of one kind or another, for example, has run to tens of 
billions of dollars over these years and tens of thousands of Americans have 
gone abroad at one time or another to carry out those programs. We have 
established widespread intelligence networks and international information 
services. We have a military structure which costs around $70 billion each 
year; under it, since the end of World War II, millions of Americans have 
been sent abroad. 
The strategic air force is on a minutes-alert. Intercontinental 
and other missiles are fused for almost instantaneous reprisals. Our navy 
is based in scattered parts of the globe and is on constant patrol of the 
Seven Seas. American forces are stationed in innumerable nations. In 
Europe as well as in Viet Nam, the level of this deployment, today, reaches 
to hundreds of thousands . 
In the two decades since World War II, our armed forces have 
fought in Korea and now fight in Viet Nam and they have incurred tens of 
thousands of casualties in the process. We have skirted other grave con-
flicts elsewhere in Asia and elsewhere in the world. In the Cuban confronta-
tion, the nuclear clock was stopped at one minute to midnight by a stroke 
of wise and restrained diplomacy. 
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We have entered into so many mutual security agreements--some 
forty pacts- -that we are committed to military action in every part of the 
globe except, perhaps, Antarctica. The wisdom of these far-flung commitments 
has been questioned from time to time, and in my judg;nent, properly so. 
Defense obligations are now so enormous and so dispersed that were the 
operative provisions of a number of these commitments to come into play 
simultaneously, our ability to discharge them, short of nuclear conflagration, 
would be most doubtful. 
In my judg;nent, all outstanding military commitments and activities 
ought to be subject to continuous scrutiny as to their current validity. 
From time to time we close surplus military bases at home. We ought not 
to be reluctant, in any sense, to reduce costly commitments abroad just as 
rapidly as their utility becomes questionable and their foreign policy pur-
poses obsolete. 
In this connection, I would note the large U. s. military deploy-
ment in Europe . For a number of years, siX u. S . divisions have been 
stationed in Western Europe under NATO. These forces plus dependents add 
up to a quasi-permanent military establishment in Europe of over half a 
million Americans. 
The annual outlay for this commitment amounts to billions of 
dollars. Many have urged a reduction of the deployment on the basis of 
cost or the gold drain and balance of payments difficulties or because of 
the competing needs of Viet Nam.. The costs of the European dePloyment, 
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to be sure, are a pressure on the domestic economy and the international 
position of the dollar. The expanding war in Viet Nam, to be sure, is an 
open pit in terms of its ever-growing requirements for men, skills, and 
materiel. 
However, the critical issue with respect to the u. s. deployment 
on European soil is not, in my judgment, a financial one; nor is it the 
competing needs of Viet Nam. If we require the present level of forces 
in Europe, the nation can find a way to deal with the financial and other 
difficulties which may be involved. The issue is whether our security, 
the security of the North Atlantic region and the security of Western 
Europe--twenty years after World War II-- continue to compel the concentra-
tion of six American divisions on the other side of the Atlantic . 
What is involved here is the accuracy of our current estimates 
of one of the critical components of our foreign policy. We need to ask 
ourselves whether conditions in Europe have changed since NATO was 
established. We need to ask ourselves whether the present level of the 
American commitment is out of step with that change. 
Let us rot delude ourselves; while our military deployment under 
NATO has not changed for many years, circumstances in Europe have changed 
greatly in recent years. They have changed in Russia and Eastern Europe . 
They have changed in Germany and Western Europe. When the troop commitment 
to NATO was assumed, the keynote of relations between the Soviet East and 
Western Europe was one of mutual. suspicion and hostility. That is not the 
case now. Today, the tone of intra-European relations has the ring of a 
reasonableness that borders on cordiality. 
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Vice President Humphrey, on returning from his recent trip to 
vlestern Europe, was quoted as predicting that in 20 years the Iron Curtain 
would be replaced with an open door. Whatever the situation may be two 
decades hence, I venture to suggest, today, two decades after World War II, 
that the door is already much more than slightly ajar, as between Eastern 
and Western Europe. 
The change in the general climate in Europe is reflected in the 
attitudes of the Western Europeans toward NATO. At one time, the European 
allies joined with us in a willing pledge of manpower and resources to the 
bud.J.dup of NATO. Today, the actions of the Western Europeans speak far 
louder than words. The actions suggest that they have long since abandoned 
earlier common concepts of NATO force goals, at least insofar as providing 
their share of manpower and materiel may be involved. 
The French reaction in this respect has been abrupt and to the 
point. Although still adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty, France has 
withdrawn all divisions and other detachments from NATO. Moreover, President 
de Gaulle has required the removal of NATO headquarters from French territory. 
Great Britain has decreased its commitment of men and resources to NATO and 
is contemplating a further cutback of its army of the Rhine. Indeed, all 
of the European NATO members, to one extent or another, have lowered the 
priority they attach to their military consignments to the NATO command. 
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It can hardly be financial difficulties that had caused the 
European allies to veer sharply from earlier military pledges; in an 
economic sense Western Europe is far more capable of meeting these pledges 
today tnan when they were made. The retrenchment, instead, appears to be 
grounded in the conviction that the style in which NATO was originally 
tailored is no longer tne mode for Europe. 
In tnese circumstances, it seems a paradox that we--alone and 
apart from our Western European allies--have felt some compelling need to 
maintain at full strength the pledged deployment of forces in Western 
Europe. The fears for the safety of tba t region against Soviet aggression 
are obviously far greater in the Executive Branch of the United States 
government than they are in the European chanceries. 
This variance of view emphasizes the cataleptic nature of our 
policy on troop deployment in Europe over the past fevr years. Of late, 
there have been indications of a relaxation in this rigidity. Even though 
the reductions in the deployment which are being discussed would appear 
wholly inadequate, it is to be hoped that there is at least a better 
appreciation of the realities of change in Europe. 
Early this year, I joined with 43 other Senators in introducing 
a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive Branch 
make a substantial reduction in the U. S. mill tary deployment in Europe. 
In my jud@llent, the actual size of the U. S. establishment in Europe ought 
to bear some relationship to what other NATO members are prepared to do 
with regard to the common defense. On this basis, I have believed for 
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some time that two or three U. S. divisions would be more in accord with 
current realities than the six which are stationed in Europe. The lower 
figure would be no less effective in emphasizing that we regard the pledge 
of mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty as binding and that we hold 
our national security as inseparable from that of Western Europe and the 
North Atlantic region. 
In all candor, I believe there have been strong tendencies to 
inertia in foreign policy, under Democratic no less than Republican ad-
ministrations. The NATO situation, as I have just discussed it, is but 
one case in point. A lag is also reflected in policies toward Eastern 
Europe. Only in recent years have these policies begun to take cognizance 
of the changes in that region. 
It is true that President Eisenhower sougnt in his administration 
to reverse some of the excesses of cold war recrimination. He tried to 
restore at least some civility to the conduct of U.S.-Soviet affairs, for 
example, by his personal association with Mr. Khrushchev and other leaders 
of the Soviet Union. It is true, too, that during President Kennedy's 
administration, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty removed a rigidity which for 
years had decreed that no agreements, regardless of how useful, should be 
concluded with the Soviet Union. It has only been in the last year or 
two, however, that as a nation we have opened our eyes to the extent of 
change in Eastern Europe and have begun to explore vigorously its potentiali-
ties. We tend no longer to react with an automatic "nyet" when opportunities 
for understanding and mutual advantage appear. Rather 1 there is a new sense 
of discernment which weighs opportunities in terms of our national interest 
and implications for a more durable peace. 
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The fact is that such opportunities have been manifest for some 
time as a result not only of changes in Eastern Europe but also in the 
atti. tudes of that region towards Western Europeo After World War II, the 
schism in the continent was a severe one. It was compounded of ancient 
rivalries, war-born vendettas, ideological parochialisms, reciprocal fears 
and the inner absorption of human energy in order to meet the great demands 
of survival and reconstruction which existed in each war-shattered region. 
After the death of Stalin, however, there was a general loosening 
of straitjackets throughout Eastern Europe. This development was manifested 
in various ways and notably in the growing response to consume! needs on the 
part of the Communist governments. The satisfaction of these needs, in turn, 
involved expanded commerce with the non-Communist world and Western Europe 
was quick to welcome it. 
The rise of trade levels between the two regions in the past 
decade has been very pronounced. It should be noted, moreover, that--
Berlin Wall notwithstanding- -West Germany leads all other non-Communist 
nations in commerce with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There has 
also been a rapid growth of communications, travel, cultural exchange and 
other contacts between Eastern and Western Europe in the last few years. 
How far this process has gone is indicated by a recent Yugoslav:· :- announce-
ment that visas would no longer be required of visitors from the West! 
These facts of change in Europe speak for themselveso The talk 
of war subsides; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard more 
clearly on all sides. In short, a European detente has not only begun, 
it is already well advanced. 
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Our reaction to change in Europe includes the initial achievements 
of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to which I have already alluded, 
as well as the international bridge building upon which President Johnson has 
embarked. What is involved in the J.atter case is a sustained effort in the 
direction of restoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet Union and 
other Eastern European nations. At the same time, the President is seeking 
a significant reduction in the military-technological rivalry which, wittingly 
or unwittingly, could lead the world into a catastrophic conflict. 
A number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are 
already associated with this effort. They deal with cultural exchanges, 
consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer 
space. Negotiations have been initiated to try to limit the incredibly 
costly arms competition of adding successive and reciprocal "antis" to the 
ballistic missile systems of each nation. Most recently, as I have noted, 
a Consular Treaty with the Soviet Union has been ratified and just a few 
days ago by a vote of 88 to 0 the Senate consented to the ratification of 
a treaty on the peaceful use of outer space. 
Emotions run deep on any question of u. s. relations with the 
Communist nations, especially in the light of the bloody conflict in Viet 
Nam. I am frank. to say that I have my own reticences in this connection. 
The pursuit of agreements with nations of Eastern Europe seems incongruous 
with the war that is being waged against us with their help on the other 
side of the globe. The best judgnents we can obtain, however, tell us that 
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the rejection of the kinds of agreements which have been made or are projected 
with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries will not make the 
slightest difference in the military situation in Viet Nam, that it will, in 
no way, diminish our casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict. 
In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our purpose 
to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be in the interests 
of this nation. I do not see that we advance the general. cause of peace by 
refusing to build more stable relations whenever and wherever an opportunity 
to do so is presented . 
If the changes in Europe constitute one of the critical components 
of the situation with which United States foreign policy must concern itself, 
a second is to be found in Asia. Along the littoral of the Western Pacific, 
there looms the unspoken but no less profound confrontation with China across 
the states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam. 
In that region, we have yet to resolve the dilemmas of policy which 
were posed by the overthrow of the national government on the Chinese mainland 
almost two decades ago. That cataclysmic event compelled the complete re-
casting of our relations with Cnina. In the space of a few postwar years, 
the framework of our relations with the Chinese central government altered 
from one of great intimacy to one of great hostility. Tne Russians replaced us 
in the role of friend and mentor in the formulations of policy whJ.cu were 
una.ertaken by the Peking People ' s Republic • 
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Cast in the role of foreign devil by the new government in Peking~ 
our policy towards the mainland became a non-policy. Of necessity, we 
settled back to "wait and see . " And through tb.e administrations of three 
Pres~ents, we have continued to look for the happening which has not 
happened. We have yet to see clearly either a way to put together the pieces 
of the policy which collapsed years ago or a way to begin afresh in our re-
lations with the Chinese mainland. 
Contacts between ourselves and the Chinese mainland have dwindled 
almost to the point of non-existence . Americans do not go there; mainland 
Chinese do not come to the United States. At intervals, U. S. diplomats 
have had significant encounters with Peking spokesmen on various issues. 
In 1950, for example, we faced Chinese Communists at the United Nations, 
on the issues of the Korean conflict . We sat down with the Chinese again 
at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, on the issues of Indo-China. 
One channel of continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking 
government has been maintained for many years . It has consisted of regular 
meetings, first in Geneva and then in Warsaw between the United States and 
Chinese Ambassadors accredited to Poland. These conversations--brief 
encounters, perhaps, would be a better term--have occurred with great 
regularity but not, to my knowledge, with results of any real import. 
The absence of travel and diplomatic exchange between China and 
the United States has been accompanied by a mutual abstention from other 
customary international relationships, notably those of trade. The fact 
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is that as a matter of official policy, we have wanted no part of trade with 
China. That is a policy which did not begin with the new bitterness generated 
by Viet Nam. It is more than a decade old. We are the only nation in the 
world, so far as I am aware, which has sought for years to enforce not only 
a primary boycott on Chinese exports but also a secondary boycott on re-
exported Chinese products. 
If the original seeds of hostility were sown, as noted, in China's 
great revolutionary upheaval, they came to fruition in the Korean conflict 
in which thousands of casualties were inflicted on each side. That bloody 
clash was followed by a near conflict over the Chinese islands of ~uemoy 
and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits. Now, once again, in Viet Nam the unresolved 
hostility with China threatens to bring about another bloody military engage-
ment between ourselves and the Chinese. 
In the light of this succession of clashes and near clashes in the 
Western Pacific it is not surprising that we are still pursuing a policy of 
"wait and see." Moreover, events inside China have supplied additional 
blocks to the formulation of positive policies on China. We see these events 
not firsthand, of course, but second and third-hand. However incomplete this 
view may be, it is still sufficient to tell us that the Chinese have entered 
the ranks of those nations with the capability of inflicting nuclear devasta-
tion. It is evident, moreover, that there is in progress even row a great 
ideological strife which gnaws at the inner core of Chinese Communism. The 
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epithets and the accusations and the protest-marches and the inflammatory 
slogans tell us that political introspection in China is very deep and 
widespread at this moment . Its impact is being felt particularly in the 
coastal cities which historically have housed strong Western influencesand 
in the provinces along the inner borders which have long felt the pull of 
the Russian presence. 
Ironically, the Soviet Union has now joined the United States 
as anathema in the policies of the Peking government. The origin of Sino-
Soviet difficulties can be traced historically to the imperial projection 
which carried Russian influence under the Czars across the Asian mainland 
into Alaska and as far as California and Hawaii before it began to retract. 
Over the centuries there have been Sino-Soviet clashes in the border regions 
of Manchuria,Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Indeed, wherever there is a convergence 
of the interests of China and Russia across the expanses of the tribal lands 
of Central Asiayancient antagonisms have periodically been reactivated. In 
my judgment these historic antagonisms have been a factor second not even 
to ideological differences in contributing to the bitterness and estrange-
ment in Chinese-Soviet relations over the past several years . 
However serious the current difficulties, we ought not to indulge 
ourselves with the expectation that they will solve our problems in Viet 
Nam or Asia. Recent developments concerning the supply of materiel to 
North Viet Nam underscore this point. In spite of the bitter antagonism, 
the Soviet Union and China have managed to work out an agreement which insures 
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the transshipment of Soviet supplies by way of China to North Viet Nam. The 
prospect would appear to be, moreover, for a diminution rather than an intensi-
fication of Sino-Soviet antipathies at this time. Indeed, in the absence of 
basic changes in the situation, the level of interdependence between Russia 
and China is likely to continue to rise the longer the Vietnamese conflict 
persists. 
In any event, we are restrained by the "wait and see" approach 
from making adjustments of policy which would take cognizance of changes 
in the Sino-Soviet situation. I might add that we have waited for years, 
but it is doubtful that we see our way any more clearly today with respect 
to China than we did a decade and a half ago. China remains a puzzlement, 
compounded of its immense complexity and our profound bewilderment. It is 
not likely that events in China will ever fall, like Chinese checkers, into 
some simple pattern which will make it easy for us to develop a new policy 
with respect to the Chinese mainland and its three-quarters of a billion 
people. Whatever course we follow will involve a great measure of un-
certainty and a high degree of risk. 
That is true for our present course or, more accurately, the 
non-course. Have we dared to ask ourselves, for example, whether or not 
the ten or fifteen years in which policy has been in abeyance in regard 
to the Chinese mainland might bear some responsibility for the tragedy in 
which we are presently involved in Viet Nam? 
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Let me turn, then, to that tragedy, to Viet Nam. It is the 
critical focus of this nation ' s present anxieties . It commands the atten-
tion of the Administration and the Congress almost to the exclusion of other 
pressing issues . Abroad, Viet Nam affects every aspect of our foreign re-
lations . As for relations with Europe, the involvement in Viet Nam narrows 
the scope of response to significant change . As for relations with the 
Chinese mainland, the involvement in Viet Nam vastly complicates the difficul-
ties which have long been pr esent. Moreover, with every military escalation 
we are brought closer to another mil itary involvement with China. 
It is ironic that a small country whose name, Viet Nam, was scarcely 
known in the United States twenty years ago has become a critical component 
of the nation ' s international affatrs . It is ironic that we are engaged on 
China ' s border with one of China ' s 11 natural enemies 11 but also with a people 
for whom we have no tradition of hostility. It is ironic that this phenomenon 
has occurred twice in less than two decades, the other occasion being, of 
course, Korea. 
One indication of the depth of our involvement in Viet Nam is the 
great concentration of United States military forc es in the Southeast Asian 
region. On the ground in South Viet Nam there are now more than 430,000 
American forces. In the waters, offshore, there are the additional 75,000 
men who compose the 7th Fleet . Another 35 , 000 American soldiers are stationed 
in Thailand, performing duties which are largely connected with the situation 
in Viet Nam. In total, then, well over half a million of our armed forces 
are consigned to the Vietnamese conflict, along with massive amounts of 
supplies and equipment . Theae forces are backed by powerful elements 
of American military strength in Okinawa, the Philippines and Guam . 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 74, Folder 3, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 18 -
A year and a half ago, I returned from Viet Nam and reported to 
Congress and the President that we were engaged in what was, in effect, an 
open-ended war whose conclusion was not in sight. At that time, the commit-
ment of U. S. forces had not yet reached 150,000 and the bombing of the north 
was sharply circumscribed. A few days ago, the Commander of the United States 
forces in Viet Nam, General Westmoreland, told a convention of the Associated 
Press: 11I do not see any end of the war in sight." In the months between 
these two comments, there has been the immense increase both in the u. s. 
manpower commitment and the level of military violence. The war, however, 
remains open-ended; there is not in sight any military way to a conclusion 
which bears a rational relationship to the original purpose for which the 
commitment was undertaken. It will be recalled that that purpose was to 
help the people of South Viet Nam preserve their freedom of political choice 
and to assist them and all the people of Southeast Asia to build a better 
material life for themselves. 
However it may eventually be brought to an end, it seems to me 
that the war in Viet Nam is not going to be resolved by personal criticism 
such as that which, from time to time, has been aimed at the President, the 
Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and others. Nor, may I say, will it be 
resolved by the stifling of the constructive debate of dif'ferences in or out 
of the Senate. Differences of viewpoint, responsibly arrived at and responsi-
bly expressed, in my jud@llent, are essential to a solution in Viet Nam. 
Restrained and thoughtful debate of policy is not a luxury, it is a necessity. 
Insofar as President Johnson is concerned, he is opm to any 
suggestions which may emerge from discussion and debate and which may hold 
some promise of peace. He knows as do we that the crucial question is not 
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how this war began but how this war can be ended at the ear~iest possib~e 
moment and in an honorab~e manner . An honorab~e ending is not going to be 
brought about by simp~istic form~as such as "get ~ the way in" or "get 
~ the way out. " An honorab~e ending is not going to be brought about by 
the spread of mi~itary vio~ence, with its attendant tragedy for ~ Vietnamese, 
north and south, for ourse~ves, and for ~ concerned . 
President Johnson ' s concern with this tragedy is as deep as yours 
or mine- -deeper perhaps because he has to live with it twenty- four hours a 
day. The ~timate responsib~ty is his and, for him, there is no surcease. 
Insofar as the Senate is concerned, there are many viewpoints on 
Viet Nam, but there is unanimity on the desirabi~ity of a prompt ending of 
this war in an honorable peace. Indeed, a few weeks ago by a vote of 89 to 2 
the Senate endorsed a continued search by the President acd others for a 
negotiated settlement of the conflict . 
As for mys~, I have expressed the view many times that the o~ 
practicab~e course is one which seeks to contain a further spread of the 
conflict in Asia, one which seeks to ~imit our involvement in the conflict 
while the effort to achieve an honorable settlement is intensified. The 
failures so far to find the formula which might lead to negotiations, in 
no sense, divests us of the obligation to ourselves, to the Vietnamese people 
and to the world to continue the search. 
To that end, many suggestions have been made . Over the past year 
or so, for example, I have publ icly proposed the following: 
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1. Military emphasis should be placed on sealing off of the 
northern border of South Viet Nam at the 17th parallel by the construction 
of a line of defense which could be maintained largely by South Vietnamese 
forces as an alternative to the continued bombing of the north. 
2. The reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis of the 
1954 and 1962 agreements, by call of the co-chairmen, the United Kingdom. 
and the Soviet Union, or by any other participants; 
3· The holding in Rangoon or Tokyo or in any other suitable place of 
an all-Asian conference to consider the conditions of an honorable peace in 
Viet Nam; 
4 . The inclusion in a peace conference on Viet Nam of any and all 
governments or groups whose concurrence may be necessary to bring about an 
end to the conflict; 
5 . The broadening o! the ManiJ.a Conference of 1966 to include 
Cnina and other non-participating nations in Asia; 
b . Tne arrangement of a face - to-face meeting of Secretary of 
State Dean RuSk and tne Foreign Minister of the Peking government to dis-
cuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam. 
In addition, I have suggested that our policymakers examine with 
great care, the views expressed by the French government, as well as by the 
Cambodian leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. I have urged that the proposals 
of U Thant and Mrs . Gandhi receive consideration. I have endorsed various 
statements of the President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all 
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of which have made clear that not only our proposals but also those of 
Hanoi and the People ' s Liberation Front might provide a basis for settle-
ment . I have recommended that there be not just a cessation of the bombing 
of North Viet Nam but a general cease-fire and standfast, with a halt on 
both sides, to maneuvers on the ground, in the sea, and in the air, to the 
end that efforts might be made to initiate talks . 
Many others in the Senate and elsewhere have offered suggestions. 
There has been no lack of proposals . Many have been pursued through the 
channels of traditional diplomacy. The distinguished Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, U Thant, has been a central figure in these secret 
diplomatic efforts to bring about peace . In spite of his great efforts 
and those of other diplomats and men of good will, peace is no closer. 
This factor has led me to question an apparent reluctance to bring 
into play the more formal machinery of the Charter of the United Nations in 
an effort to break down the barriers to peace. I question this reluctance 
again today. The fact is that the U. N ., to date, has not even taken 
official cognizance of the existence of a conflict in Viet Nam. That sort 
of ostrich• approach seems to me to court for the organization irrelevancy 
at best and eventual disaster at worst . 
I do not believe anyone has a right to expect, with respect to 
Viet Nam, a miracle of peace from the U. N. I do believe, however, that the 
peoples of the world have a right to expect some public indication of concern 
of member nations, as to the dangers of this conflagration. There is a 
right to expect, at l east, some effort to use the machinery of the Charter 
to dampen down the flames in Viet Nam before the war goes entirel y out of 
control. 
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There are, of course, great difficulties involved in the assumption 
of an active role by the U.N. with respect to Viet Nam. Two of the principal 
parties concerned--North Viet Nam and Communist China--for example, are not 
members of the United Nations . That does not foreclose , however, a contribu-
tion from the U.N. It has seemed to me entirely appropriate•••••• 
that at the very least, the U.N. should open its forum to discussion of the 
problem by all involved directly or indirectly in Viet Nam--members and non-
members alike. Such a procedure is proper; it is precedented; it is not 
subject to veto. There is no reason, so far as I can see, why the Security 
Council cannot offer to bring together not only the member states who are 
most intimately concerned in the situation--that is, the United States and 
the Soviet Union- ·but also the non-members, that is, Communist China, North 
Viet Nam, the government of South Viet Nam and any other group of relevance 
to a peaceful settlement. I should think, too, that the Security Council 
might also consider requesting the International Court of Justice to render 
an advisory opinion on the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. All of the 
belligerents have made reference, from time to time, to these Accords as 
the basis for a peaceful settlement. Certainly, it is appropriate to try 
to see through the impartial and judicious eyes of the Court what the 
applicability of these agreements may entail in present circumstances. 
Let me make clear that I suggest the pursuit of peace through the 
U.N. Security Council not in lieu of private or secret diplomacy, not in 
lieu of a revival of the Geneva Conference. Rather, I suggest it as a 
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supplement or precipitant of these approaches or any other which may hold 
some promise of a solution. 
As I have noted, the effort has been made since the outset to 
find a pathway to peace through secret and traditional diplomacy and it 
has been unsuccessful. Therefore, I think there is everything to be gained 
and nothing to be lost at this time by a public search before the U. N. for 
the gaps between the positions of the belligerents and the means by which they 
may be bridged. 
There is no assurance that a resort to the procedural machinery 
of the United Nations will produce any more significant results than those 
yielded by secret and traditional diplomacy. That will not be known, however, 
unless and until the approach is tried. 
Insofar as this nation is concerned, I cannot see that we violate 
our own interests or the interests of any other nation by a vigorous pursuit 
of peace at the U. N. Based on the Korean precedents, our government can 
very properly urge upon the Security Council a vote on these two specific 
resolutions pertaining to Viet Nam: 
One, that the Secretary General be instructed to invite 
governments and groups directly and indirectly involved in the Vietnamese 
conflict, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate before the 
Council in an open and unlimited discussion of the conflict; 
Two, that the Security Council request the International 
Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability 
of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agree-
ments may place on those directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnamese 
Qonflict. 
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In closing, may I emphasize that the responsibility for the conduct 
of our nation's foreign affairs is vested in the President of the United 
States. Whether we agree with him or disagree, whether he pleases or dis-
pleases us, will not lighten one iota the onerous burdens which rest on his 
shoulders as a result of the Vietnamese conflict. The President may look 
for advice to his aides in the Executive Branch. He may look to the Senate 
and to the people of this nation. Whether or not advice is forthcoming, 
whether or not there is consent to his course, the President still must 
decide what he believes to be in the best interests of the United States. 
That is his responsibility. He cannot share it--he can only assume it, on 
behalf of all of us. 
The President needs and should have our understanding, our help 
and prayers, and the support which can be given to him in good conscience. 
It ought to be borne in mind at all times that whatever contribution this 
nation can make to a peaceful settlement in Viet Nam, that contribution can 
only be made and will be made on behalf of all of us, in the end, by the 
President of the United States. 
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THE WESTERN PACIFIC 
Perspective and Prospective 
It is my understanding that at any given time up 
to 75 ocean-going vessels can be counted in San Francisco Bay . 
Within a 24-hour period, 50 planes on international schedule will 
pass through the gateways of this city. In a year, the Bay region 
moves 13 million tons of cargo in and out of the nation. Over 
the same period, 400 to 500 thousand travelers enter or leave by 
way of its portals. 
These are figures which add to the cosmopolitan 
luster of this magnificent city and I kno\'T they are a delight to 
the Chamber . They are also figures, may I say, which are not 
calculated to grate on the ears of this distinguished group of 
world traders . 
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As a Senator of the United States, I share your 
pleasure in an immense volume of international trade. Since 
Montana lacks ocean ports, moreover, it is quite agreeable that 
a lion's share move through the waters which lie within the 
jurisdiction of the sponsoring Chamber. In view of the entrepot 
which San Francisco provides for this great two-way flow, the 
name "Old Gold Mountain," which is what I understand the Chinese 
call the city, seems most appropriate. 
There is great value in a thriving intercourse 
with countries beyond our borders. The exchange of goods and 
peoples is a contribution to the nation's peace and well -being. 
It is a source of enrichment of our national life. 
In these times, however, any pleasure which comes 
from international interchange is not unalloyed. Rather, it is 
tinged with a profound concern because Viet Nam figures in the 
figure with which I opened my remarks. You and I know that a 
part of the 13 million tons of cargo is military cargo; it is 
headed for a brutal struggle in distant jungles and rice paddies. 
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You and I know that the travelers using the facilities of this 
city are not all bent on commerce or pleasure. The travelers 
include tens of thousands of Americans outward bound for war or 
homecoming from war, many bearing the scars of conflict and some 
in the stillness of death. The latest casualty figures show more 
than 10, 000 Americans killed and 55 , 000 wounded in Viet Nam. 
So the satisfaction which comes from a flourish-
ing international exchange, I repeat, is diluted by the implica-
tions of Viet Nam. Viet Nam casts a shadow not only over your 
commercial preoccupations; in the same way, it also dims other 
aspects of our national life . As Majority Leader of the Senate, 
for example , I have had some association with the enactment of 
the legislative programs of the Kennedy and Johnson Administra-
tions. These programs, in my judgment , make exceptional con-
tributions to the nation's approach to the problems of older 
citizens, publtc health , education, conservation of natural 
resources , recreational facilities, taxation and economic 
growth , international trade, transportation, communications, 
4 ; •• 
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power supply, and many other long-neglected public needs of the 
American people. 
Some of you may regard these programs in a dif-
ferent light. However they may be judged, I can assure you that 
from the point of view of a professional legislator , the enact-
ment of the Kennedy and J ohnson programs represents , in terms of 
volume and scope, a unique legislative achievement. 
The satisfaction which might be found in the 
achievement, however, is dulled by the deepening concern with 
Viet Nam. And whatever contribution the enactment of the 
Kennedy and Johnson programs may have made to the public life 
of the nation lies largely in the engulfing shadow of Viet Nam. 
The Vietnamese conflict has something of the same 
effect on the nation's foreign relations. It thr ows into doubt, 
for example, the fragile beginning in the improvement of relations 
with the Eastern European nations. It introduces a note of 
diffidence into our associations with the Western Europeans who 
are unwilling- - to say the least--to immerse themselves in the 
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question of Viet Nam. It obscures the unfolding of events in 
Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and even in other parts 
of Asia which may have great significance for this nation. 
That American interest should be concentrated on 
Viet Nam is as inevitable as it is understandable. The implica-
tions of Viet Nam are stark and immediate. More and more the 
war involves the young man next door. Already i t touches 
directly a great number of American hearts . It demands much 
from many in the way of tangible personal sacrifice. Millions 
of Americans have been in Viet Nam or know someone who has been 
in Viet Nam. Millions more can expect to be exposed to a 
similar experience. 
Viet Nam is war and war takes precedence over 
other affairs of the nation. On that point there ought to be 
no ground for confusion or doubt. The support which the Americar 
forces in Viet Nam have received has been unstinting. They are 
the best equipped and supplied military organization in the 
history of warfare. Whatever has been sought by the President 
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for the conduct of operations in Viet Nam has been granted by 
the Congress and by overwhelming votes. Congres~ t$ ~n record 
by a resolution, which I myself happen to have introduced, 
assuring to the men in Viet Nam the unequivocal support of the 
nation. 
That will continue to be the case for as long as 
necessary. Let neither friend nor foe be under any misapprehen-
sion on that score. Americans in Viet Nam shall receive what-
ever they may require to carry out their assignments. They did 
not choose to go to Viet Nam; they were sent there by the poli-
cies of the United States government. To differ with the poli-
cies in no way inhibits a sense of obligation to the servicemen 
in Viet Nam. Nor, may I add, does full support of these men 
require rote endorsement of the policies which sent them there. 
To insist that the two are inseparable is to equate the open 
heart of patriotism with the closed mind of political conformity. 
President Johnson, may I say, was among the first 
to reject any suggestion that the two are linked. I know from 
personal knowledge that he welcomes responsible discussion of 
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the question of Viet Nam and that he is prepared to listen to 
all reasonable suggestions on how the conflict may be terminated 
in honor. 
It must be faced frankly, however, that the end 
is not in sight in Viet Nam . It is not in sight, by military 
action or negotiations, or any visible combination. The question 
of Viet Nam has taken on ever increasing significance to Ameri -
cans as the massive buildup of forces in Southeast Asia has pro-
ceeded. That buildup gives to the matter another dimension by 
underscoring the depth of the commitment of the United States to 
help the people of South Viet Nam preserve a choice over their 
political future. 
In view of the sacrifices which already have been 
made, Viet Nam is now embedded in the feelings of the nation. 
That is all the more reason for responsible public discussion of 
the issues which are posed by this situation. Unless it ensues, 
the conflict in Viet Nam cannot be placed in accurate perspective 
in terms of the domestic needs and other problems abroad which 
confront the United States . 
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I would emphasize that Viet Nam is not the sum 
of our national difficulties. Notwithstanding Viet Nam, smog 
will still settle over the cities of the nation. There will be 
no letup in the pollution of rivers, streams, and tidewaters. 
Viet Nam will not spare us a long summer of racial and other 
tension in the smoldering cities. Viet Nam will not reduce the 
pressure of population on the police, transport, educational, 
housing, and other facilities of the great urban centers. What 
is required to maintain a prosperous and inflation-free economy 
and a flourishing international exchange--as you well know--
will not be lessened by Viet Nam. 
Problems of this sort have been the preoccupation 
of the Congress for the past several years. I believe the 
legislation which has been enacted goes to the heart of many of 
them. But this legal machinery must be used energetically and 
it must be used wisely. If it is neglected, if it grinds to a 
halt because of the preoccupat i on with Viet Nam, the nation will 
suffer the consequences in the years ahead. A concentration on 
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Viet Nam may obscure the public needs of the nation but it will 
not alleviate them. On the contrary, Viet Nam will complicate 
and exacerbate all of them. 
In a similar vein, it should be noted that the 
flow of events throughout the world will not wait upon a disposal 
of the problem of Viet Nam. There are questions of foreign re-
in 
lations elsewherejwhich the stake of the nation is also very 
great, but which tend to be overlooked in present circumstances. 
One has only to note, for example, the current turn of develop-
ments in the Middle East. We may well ask ourselves is the 
change in that situation as sudden as it now appears? Or did 
the crisis gather while our preoccupations were elsewhere? 
I would stress, therefore, that it is vital to 
consider VietNam in the context of the nation's worldwide 
interests. In particular, we need to see this conflict in 
Southeast Asia in the perspective of the nation ' s over-all 
position in the Western Pacific. 
Certain similarities between Korea and Viet Nam 
are relevant to that perspective. Both, for example, lie at 
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extremities of an antagonistic mainland China and both are on 
the Asian littoral of the Pacific Ocean. Both are former 
colonial dependencies. Both were set free but were divided in 
the wake of the collapse, respectively, of Japanese and French 
power. 
Our military involvements in the two conflicts 
developed as a response to aggressive incursions from a 
Communist - linked north into an American-linked south . These 
incursions were launched, however, not in the name of Communism 
but under the banner of nationalism--of national liberation and 
unity . 
Both the conflict in Korea and in Viet Nam have 
pitted us in brutal struggle against peoples for whom we have 
had no tradition of hostility. Both conflicts have exacted a 
heavy toll of suffering and destruction amongst those people 
and a large price in American lives and resources . Our direct 
military involvement in each instance began as a limited effort, 
on top of a prolonged period of economic and military aid to a 
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weak indigenous government . With U. N. sanction and support, 
we sought to assist the South Koreans to repel an invasion from 
North Korea. This initial and successful campaign was then 
pushed beyond its original purpose and led, against expectations, 
into a massive and indecisive clash with mainland Chinese forces. 
In Viet Nam we have had the support of certain 
allied Asian and other Western Pacific nations but, to date, 
the United Nations has maintained a formal silence. It has not 
sanctioned the U.S. action. Indeed the U.N. has not yet even 
' 
taken formal note of the existence of the conflict. That is, 
may I say, an immense understatement of a massive oversight. 
If I may digress for a moment, I would express 
the hope that steps will be taken to bring the U.N. into this 
question in the nea~ future. At the very least, the U.N. 
Security Council should recognize the existence of the struggle 
and seek to bring all the disputants into a cards-on-the-table 
confrontation. 
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As in Korea, our military involvement in Viet 
Nam began as a limited support undertaking. By air and sea, 
however, the military effort has now been expanded into North 
Viet Nam . At the same time, the war in the south has become, 
increasingly, an American military operation which pits our 
forces against both North Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong 
guerrillas . 
The expansion of this conflict in Viet Nam, in 
my judgment, carries the strong possibilities of another massive 
clash between China and the United States and even the seeds of 
World War III. It is not that all concerned do not remember 
the Korean experience. It is not that this nation would deli-
berately enlarge the Vietnamese conflict into a provocative 
challenge to China. It is simply that military actions once 
launched tend to establish their own momentum in which one 
step leads inexorably to the next. We may well ask ourselves 
before we go much further in this process how many steps have 
already been taken in this fashion since the first American 
bomb fell on North Viet Nam scarcely three years ago? 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 74, Folder 3, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 13 -
The successive steps have drawn U.S. military 
power deeply into Viet Nam . In this involvement, as with the 
Korean conflict a decade and a half ago, we have made an immense 
military commitment in a region in which our national interests 
were minimal before World War II. A quarter of a century ago, 
Viet Nam and Korea scarcely piqued our national curiosity. 
American foreign policy found little of relevance 
to our national security and welfare in Korea. The same was 
true of Viet Nam or, for that matter, of Indo-China as a whole, 
except perhaps as that region came under the control of the 
Japanese war machine after 1940. Pre-World War II trade with 
these two Asian peninsulas was almost non-existent. Americans 
did not travel to either of them in any great numbers . In 
fact, in 1953, when I visited Laos with an associate, the two 
of us doubled the American population there . Even at that late 
date, there were only two young American vice-consuls living 
in the entire country. And in Viet Nam, that year, the total 
of Americans certainly did not exceed two hundred, almost all 
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government officials and including several in an American 
consular establishment in Hanoi. 
The contrast, today, is staggering. We have 
mobilized in and around Viet Nam in Southeast Asia an American 
~~~ 
military force t-.in f xcess of half-a-million men. We have thrown 
into this conflict an enormous quantity and assortment of mili-
tary materiel. We have consigned great air and naval power to 
the struggle. Expenditures for military operations in Viet 
Nam have now reached an annual rate which is estimated at $25 
billion and is still rising. 
As I have noted, this great commitment has been 
undertaken in a region which, a few years ago, was scarcely 
visible on the spectrum of the nation's interests in the 
Western Pacific and of even less significance in terms of the 
world-wide position of the United States. The precipitous 
increase to the present level of concern with Viet Nam raises 
certain fundamental questions . We must ask ourselves whether 
the Vietnamese involvement (and, for that matter, the Korean 
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involvement) signifies a new concept of American interests in 
the Western Pacific? Do these incursions into the Asian main-
land signal a permanent recasti ng of our policies? 
Before trying to answer theae questions, let me 
refer briefly to the pattern of American policy in the Far 
Pacific prior to World War II . To put it succinctly, U.S. 
policy traditionally resisted the committnent of substantial 
American military power anywhere on Asian soil and, particularly, 
anywhere much beyond the reach of naval support and supply. 
Even during World War II, the number of Americans who fought on 
the Asian mainland was but a fraction of the forces which we 
have at the present time in Viet Nam. 
In setting the Philippines free in 1946, moreover, 
this nation turned its back on a colonial role in Asia . To put 
it another way, we rejected once and for all a dominant respon-
sibility for the affairs or future of any Asian people. Rather 
than chase the illusions of imperialism, this nation saw its 
interests in the Far East as lying precisely in the activities 
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which many in this group pursue for a living. We saw those 
interests in commercial and other exchange with an Asia of 
peaceful, independent and developing nations. To that end, 
we were prepared to join with others in a judicious transfer 
of the skills, knowledge and capital of modernization. 
In my judgment, the present involvement in Viet 
Nam in no way, shape, or form signals a substantial recasting 
of our position in the Far East. The Vietnamese conflict, as 
the Korean conflict before it, is a consequence of the collapse 
of Japanese and French imperial power. It is a consequence of 
the understandable weakness of the successor states. Above all 
else, it is a consequence of the Chinese revolutionary sweep 
of the mainland and the ideological fears and other uncertain-
ties whi ch were engendered by this cataclysmic change. 
However, neither the involvement in Viet Nam nor 
in Korea, I would reiterate, reflects a permanent change in our 
position. The role of American power on the Asian mainland was 
and will one day, again, be limited. We did not shake loose of 
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the costly responsibilities in the Philippines only to assume 
them in Viet Nam by a new name. Our extraordinary military 
incursion into the Asian mainland will end as soon as the 
extraordinary circumstance s which have evoked it have also ended. 
In the second half of the 20th century, this 
nation is a wor ld power , not a colonial power . The global 
scope of our current inter ests requires us to exercise the 
responsibilities of the former even as it compels us to reject 
the trappings of the latter. In a similar vein, I would suggest 
QV 
to you that the United States occupies the position of ~Pacific 
~ 
power, not that of ~Asian power . The difference is more than 
semantic. 
Every significant development in, on, and over 
the Pacific Ocean has direct relevance to the security and well-
being of the United States and we have a substantial capacity 
to exercise a rational influence over the course of these de-
velopments . We do not live, however, on the mainland of Asia 
"' ·· : · . 
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and the practical reach of our influence in the Far Pacific 
does not extend very far inland from littorals. We do not 
have a unique or unilateral interest in what transpires on 
theAsianmainland. To the extent that we have an interest at 
all, it is an interest which is shared with other nations, in 
the peace, stability, and progress of one of the great regions 
of the world. 
In this context, our involvement in Viet Nam 
will be seen to be a temporary phenomenon. Indeed, the President 
has made this point over and over again. He has emphasized that 
we shall not pursue the course of a bankrupt and bankrupting 
colonialism in Asia. He has emphasized that as soon as an 
honorable settlement can be negotiated we will reverse the 
extraordinary deployment of our military power into Southeast 
Asia. He has said time after time that we seek neither territory 
nor permanent bases in that region. 
Once peace is restored in Viet Nam, there could 
l 
emerge the conditions which will allow us to resume fully the 
pursuit of our traditional interests in the Western Pacific. 
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In particular, it is to be anticipated that the prime inter-
national events of the Western Pacific will once again revolve 
around the triad of Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. Indeed, 
there are signs that this restoration is already underway. 
I would note, for example, that the clash of 
historic border claims and other differences between China and 
the Soviet Union has shattered the abnormal monoll.thic pattern 
of relations between these two nations. Yet only a few years 
ago it was commonly thought that through Communism, Russia 
could fasten a permanent yoke on China. Indeed, we find, today, 
that there is not even a common Communist ideology within China, 
much less one which binds the Chinese in inseparable subser--
vience to the Russiar1s. 
To be sure, a mutual interest intlle conflict in 
Viet Nam has restrained differences to some degree between the 
Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic and additional 
extensions of the war, moreover, could act to strengthen the f,11f 0'~""CI.Y 
bridge between them. If, as, and when the Vietnamese conflict 
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is settled, however, the normal difficulties between China and 
Japan's 
once again to come into full play. . r 
()../ ~ . 
/ 
relations with mainland China' have also ' 
Russia may be expected 
developed from the total alienation two decades ago in the 
direction of a reassertion of natural cultural and economic 
affinities. It might be noted, for example, that mainland 
China's trade with Japan now surpasses that of Taiwan. The 
total reached $600 million in 1966, almost evenly divided 
between exports and imports. In that year, China also became 
Japan's fourth largest trading partner. 
f"vL 
~ 
'»~ 
~~ 
~ 
y:Y: 
Similar tendencies towards normalization are to 
be found in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union . Under 
a five-year trade agreement which was initiated in 1965, total 
trade between the two nations will approach half-a-billion 
dollars for the year 1967, a large increase over last year. 
There is also under discussion at high levels in the Japanese 
and Soviet governments plans for the joint development of Siberia 
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These involve the exploitation of gas resources on Soviet 
Sakhalin, the building of an immense pipeline in Siberia, and, 
possibly, the exploitation of Soviet timber and copper resources. 
International developments of this kind , as I 
noted at the outset of my remarks, tend to be overlooked in 
our concern with Viet Nam. Yet, we cannot afford to ignore 
them, particularly when they may indicate changing situations 
which are of great significance to our national interests. 
In my judgment, the re - emergence of a free inter-
play among Japan, China, and the Soviet Union is a welcome 
development . It tends to restore the normal core of relations 
in the Western Pacific. It tends also to bring closer the day 
when this nation may rechannel its energies fully into the 
pursuit of our traditional interests in that region. President 
Johnson, in fact, has already begun to put emphasis on these 
interests. He has been, for example, a prime mover in taking 
the multi-nation Mekong River Development Project from the 
drafting boards where it had rested for many years to the 
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construction sites of Southeast Asia . He has given strong but 
appropriate U.S. support to the creation of the Asian Develop-
ment Bank. He has pledged our contribution to the enormous tasks 
of reconstruction and development in all of Southeast Asia which 
must surely follow the conflict in Viet Nam. In these and other 
ways, he has made it abundantly clear that what we seek are the 
lasting achievements of peace and notthe fleeting triumphs of 
war . 
Peace in Viet Nam will pave the way for a reduc-
tion and return of our military forces from the Southeast Asian 
peninsula . One would hope that it might also pave the 
way for a reduction and return of our forces from the Korean 
peninsula . These pull -backs of American power , of course, can-
not and will not occur in a vacuum. As a prerequisite, they 
will require satisfactory political settlements of the problems 
of the Korean partition and the Vietnamese division. They will 
require assurances of stability in the Formosan Straits which, 
in effect, would involve a settlement of the questions of the 
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Chinese partition. They will require the establishment of 
effective international guarantees of the peace and security 
of nations both large and small throughout Eastern and Southeast 
Asia. In short, they will require the liquidation of the prob-
lems left over from World War II and the Chinese Revolution. 
I do not know when all involved will be prepared 
for the face-to-face negotiations which are necessary to restore 
and maintain a durable peace in the Western Pacific. I do know 
that the sooner there can be a rendezvous with realities in Asia 
on the part of all involved, the better for this nation, for the 
Asian nations and for the world. 
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R»1A.RKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD 
at 
Aunt Emmy ' s 90th Birthday Celebration 
Friday, May 26, 1967 
1 have never kept a tally of the number of speeches which 1 have 
made in the course o£ t"lirty or m ore years of public life. I suppose it 
would total in the thousands. 5ome I have m ade as a. politician, others as 
a spokesman fo r the Nation, and son1e as just a friend. Tonight I put you, 
Aunt Emy, in a cpecial category. I stand not only as your friend, but as 
your ad~irer . 
1 want to say to yt:>u in behalf of .liaurcen, MY dauehter, Anne, and 
m yself, and all of your many f riends and admirers, that you hold a special· 
place in our hearts . You hold it because we che rish the friendship of Jane, 
and your son, Charlie ·- - who reilects in his person warmth and a great 
decency in his understanding and his wis<.lom -- the contributions which you 
have ,"l'lade to hi. • You hold a special place too, because you are you; be-
cause you are a lovely, charming wom an, who has given m uch to life and so 
drawn much from it . 
May 1 also say, Aunt Emy, that what makes it an especially m emorable 
occasion is not the number of years, but what you have done·with those years . 
1 extend to you on behalf of all of us, then, our warmest affection, and our 
best wishes for your health, vitality, and happiness . 
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IN THE SHADOW OF VIET NAM 
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania 
Tuesday, May 30, 1967, 11 :00 A. M. 
It is doubtful that there has ever been a good 
time to graduate from college . There is only an inevitable time 
and you have arrived at it . If you have a sense of concern as to 
the future, it may be some't'lhat reassuring to note that it is a 
feeling which has been shared by grad~ating c~~:se~ ~s far back 
as anyone can remember. 
And, y...;·t- > -~his class OI~ :967 is e::.·c::.· .... :....;u to an 
uncommon concern aoo'..lt the future . You graduate i?: ___ common 
circumstances. You walk out directly into the shadow of Viet 
Nam . 
Since that is the case, you are no~ likely to have 
much interest in wha~ I might say abou~ the job oppo~~~~ities 
"out there" . Nor do I believe that you would be especially 
enthralled by comments on medicare, high't'lay beautification, 
I 
' 
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antipoverty programs, the peace corps or a dozen or more other 
creative and useful legislative enterprises which have been 
initiated in recent years by the federal government . 
I expect that what you expect from me is to make 
some sense on the question of Viet Nam--on the war and its pros-
pects and your prospects in the light of it. I do not know that 
I can live up to those expectations if 1-1hat you seek is a punch-
card computation of satisfying answers. I do not have that sort 
of information and I do not know how to run the computers . As 
one Senator, I have only the personal estimates and attitudes 
which come fro~ a long effort to try to und.ers'tand '.:hat is involved 
in the problems of Viet Nam and Asia. I have only the concerns 
which I share \-.Ti th young people as to their personal future in 
the light of t!':is persisting difficulty . I have only an aT.·Iareness 
of the curtain of uncertainty which Viet Nam has drawn across the 
I 
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pursuit of happiness in this nation and the prospects for con-
tinued civilized survival everywhere in the l'Torld . 
On the part of the United States, the eventual 
resolution of the conflict in Viet Nam will depend greatly on 
the President and the Executive Branch of the government. It 
will, also, depend in part on Senators and Congressmen. In the 
last analysis, ho't'rever, it l'lill depend heavily on the people of 
the nation and, in particular, on the reaction of young persons 
such as yourselves to th~s situation. Your opinions on Viet Nam 
are relevant and you have not only a right but, if you are so 
inclined, a public duty to express them. You also have, however, 
an obligation to ask; you have a responsibility to listen and these 
are antecedent to the responsible exercise of your right and duty 
to speak. In short, you owe it to yourselves, to your country 
and to the vitality of the institutions ~n which you have matured 
to make your opinions as informed as possible. In the hope of 
contributing something to that end, I make these remarks today . 
I 
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The Viet Nam war has been so often in the news 
that at times it seems that for several years nothing else of 
note has happened in the world . We have had an incessant born-
bardment from the communications media . We have been exposed 
to the horrors and the heroics and to the destruction and the 
dedication of this war. We have had almost a surfeit of facts 
as well as a torrent of irrelevances. Yet the pattern of the 
conflict is illusive and its purposes remain obscure . We have 
known the frustration which comes from an ever more intensely 
sought peace in an ever more intensely fought war. 
It is difficult in these circumstances to maintain 
a balanced view of the conflict ~ our role in it. Indeed, the 
Vietnamese conflict is as a powerful drug which has been ad-
ministered to the American body politic . The effect on some 
individuals has been that of a heady stimulant ; they would go all 
out to get out . For them the solution to this grim conflict is 
"to pull out the stopper and let ' s have a whopper . " I respect 
0 
I 
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·..;he right o:" -~hose, 1:rho are so :::.~clined, to expr-e~s d:::.ssent :'ror.!. 
policies of res-vr-ai;:;.t, even to the ex·cent of calling for a re-:ur;:;. 
s·co:::e-Age' bu·::; I a:. so :".LOS"C :respectfully disagree ui th them . 
T!J.e honorable :road ou.t o-: Viet Na-::1. is no·c one 1·rhic:h :.eads ever 
more deeply into .t~.sia. (}, des::..rable ena to tn<:.! v1ar in v:..et !'!am is 
not ·:.;o bG l'ou.."ld by exte:ndii:g the bat:clGfield::. to the rest of South-
eas· ... AsiE:. and ·co China. :t ::.s, or ought to be, crystal c:ea:r to all 
by ·chis :!.ate da·ce, -:hat it ::..s ve:ry easy to expand this involve:::-.ent 
on ~~e Asian ~a:::.nland, bu~ that it :..s i~~ensely difficult to con-
-: -·-
~ v. 
:: do not believe that the circun.stances o~ this 
conflicJc hav-:. ger..erated ar:.y greajc em.;husiasm for expansion of the 
"t·.rar.. Rathe::· ·chey have inducea a deep concern as to i·cs extent 
and \,he elus:.. veness of its conclusion. It is no less a concern 
because i·c :..s accorr:.pa.Y!ied by a si:..en·c accep·cance of its great costs. 
:r·::e fact ::.s thc.:c tile ~-rar be·.~·ilders. ':::he s<::nsi ti vi ties of our 
society a:c""' changed. Figures to·::;aling billions of dollars tend 
J 
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c · re "" ... c. no~. :·:.:.-.:;h -~he ~or.. -comprt!he .. ~ion o.:.: scores i::: a spor·~ 
n .. e are :::;.ot .:.r..teres..,ed . T!nlesc af:ected d.:.:c(;c·.:.:y by 
~r~onn~ considera~lonsJ ~he grisly casualty counts are accep~ed 
as th"' regul.. ... r .. o ... ·r..: .. ..., cup of co:':'ee . 
:..n "Che e;ro~;.:.r.g demands of 1..ra:.· ·:::here is n ·.::cr..c.ency to consign to a 
l.:.mbo pressing dc ... e..,"t.:.c p:."o"bl""r.ls nnd other iscu .... s o ... · foreign policy . 
-~~ ~duca~~- o~ess of the ~onetary costs of V~et 
·a.'!l ru."'l..... ·rc ... y2 o.:.ll.:on a ffiO!'l"vh, o~: 24 o:.llicn anm.4c..l:y, to 
2. 7 bL.:.:.on p"'r n.on·.:::'1 c:.· !'!':.O!"e th~ $32 bil:::.ion an~.-....a::!.y . 
C t . f. f' $2- . . 11 . .p • • -er E..-n y a _zure o... ::> o~ __ :.on _or o. year gl ves so .. .:::; reasona:Le 
.nd.:.catton o: ..,h~ cur~en~ rate of speneinu for the war . It ~s 
a fi0 ure, mor-...over, t[la·c is not ..;oing c.m:n; it ic going up . Keep 
in mind, moreover, J.::r.a·c I ar!'l speaking only of the cost of our 
m::.litary e ... ·fort in 'Viet ·xa'!"!!.. Tnat :·epresents only abo1:t a third 
of our annual dei'ense expenc..:-:::ures of over $70 'billion . 
I 
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c. year fer '.:ar ..; .... Vie-c ~a~: means i.f the figure i>=> co:..:pared "::i -ch t'!'".e 
0:1 -~he basis o:' ~he 
Pres.:.der::c 1 s budget requests in J·anua:ty for th~;.; co:-nin.; fiscal year, 
for example: 
uould .-••• '0'"'\ ~ ..... lA,i._\,.4 all federal transportation proposa:s, 
__ .clud::.:::.g our huge h:.g:n_":;ay construc·cio-:: progra!'!'l 
c... •• d of sue~ item~ as high- speed 
!'o..:.::..:.. oad anc. co.:1.':.uter services anc -che supersonic 
pa~se~ger airplane; 
A year's cost o1 veterans' benefits and services 
gro"~:;ing out of all past ·wars could be met with 12 
t..'eeks of cur:ren-c \•Jar expenditures in Viet Nam.; 
Eigh·~ ~·:ee~s o:· :Y!ili -cary expenses in Viet :~am equal 
all o=: the =:ede:cal :-.. onies sought for education--
elementary, secondary) higher, vocational and 
I 
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inter-.'lationa2.--a:r.d the special f':.1nds ::'or inproving 
education i~ ci~y sl~~s a~d dep:!'cssed ru~a: areas; 
cos~s o'! ""1-C..-- housing ar.d affa:.rs p:rogra.ils 
of the fecera: gover'~~ent, :.nc:udin6 slum clearance 
and o·cher e:·torts to r:.ake Jch"' nation: s cities safer 
and more sa·cisfying places fo:c human habitation 
represe~t 6 t.:eeks of ·che cos-c o:r: the Vic.·cnamese war; 
':'he e .,.. .. .:-~"' ..... v-~ '-' 
~i::.:.o~s or· :::-2ngry people abroad supporved on 
·che e _uivalen·c of less \,han 4 \'Ieeks o:::~ •:-:a::c costs 
.:.n Viet l!a:;:. 
'!'he international c..ctivitie.:. in t·:hich vle participate 
:.:·o:· the purposes of hurr.ani"t.arian and econor<1ic goals and above all, a 
m.ore s·cable peace, can be expressed in simila:~ stark contrasts . The 
an:1.ua: level of U.S. approp::::-:.ations... for exa~ple, for ·che inter-
--~ericar.. Alliance for Progress--r:mch of i·-:hich is repayable, 
,, 
I 
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repres...,m~s only abou·c 6 ·.~eeks of ·.n::.:.:--co:.ts - ""l"" ... c;.. ..... One 
economist has e::;t.:..r.-1a·cec. tha"~ a needed red.:..str:.ou·cion o;.~ :'ar:-:: la:"ld 
·co peasc:mts -:::hroughc-..... ~ _::c.-::::.., ?akis·;:;an, ·cr.e coas·cal areas of As.:..a, 
a.n ...... all o~· Latin A..~erica, could be brough'c about equitv.b::.y a~'1d 
Hi thout confi.,ca-cion, for abo-u:c $5 b.:..llion O.L' ·..,o·.;.~: cost. T:1at 
vmuld be -che equi valen·c of :.o wee"c::; of ~J:~r exp...,ndi "Ct:.res in Viet 
Pinal:.y a look su:;;gcsts that -c::e 
entire annua:. U.~. ccn~:-~b-.....-cio~ "(,0 the rcgul~r budget and to all 
o~he_· pros:ca ... ~ cr· tha-c o::·ganizat~on, sucn as 1:.he peace :.r:.eeping 
~ .. .:.ssions ~n the : . .:..dd:.e Eas·~, CypTus a."":d else'::her<:; comes -co 80 hou::-s 
o:: 3 c. .. JS of vrar expenditures in Viet Na'!'n. 
':::'ha·~ the great burden of Viel:. N·am has been met l:rith-
ou~ shi!'·cing the eco:·10my t;o a wa.rtime foo·cing c..nd with surprisingly 
:i~tle i~fla-cion is a co~~entary on the vitality of the nation's 
proc.uc·c.:.. ve facilities. It is also a tribu-:::e to the skill ':lith \'.'"hich 
·che President and his Ad:-::ir.istrat.:..on have conduc·ced -che federal 
govern'!'nent's role in the nation:s economic and fiscal affairs . 
/ 
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Nevertheless, it would be pointless t0 ignore the 
prospect of a convergence of factors which may require us to accept 
controls and higher taxes or alternatively, to suffer a serlous and, 
in the end, destructive infl_ation. We are approaching the point 
·'"'here gro\'Ting needs in Viet Nam are begin..'1 ; ng to draw significant 
n~~bers of skilled workers out of civilian production into military 
service and defense industries. At the same time , there is no 
corresponding decrease in the demand for consumer goods . To fill 
the gap in part, we import in greater and greater quantities and 
this process, in turn, leads to grm: · ng complications and difficul-
ties in the balance of payments. 
~fuatever the economic implications , however, the 
fundamental tragedy of Viet Nam lies not so much in those considera-
tions as in the toll of human life and hope. Already the over-all 
casualties are more than one-third that of the Kore~n war. 
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It is grim to speak of human suffering by way of 
statistics, yet some numerical comparisons are necessary if we 
are to understand the dimensions of Viet Nam. In the first three 
weeks of April, for example, 518 Americans were killed in action. 
C9-'V"lA- 10 , 0 o o 
These young men joined fiear l y 9,0~ others who have lost their 
lives since U.S. troops were committed to Viet Nam. So far the 
number of young Pennsylvanians alone who have been killed in Viet 
Nam is about equal to the entire student body of Haverford College. 
C)'V-t/\... 6 (\ 0 00 
In addition to the dead, there have been 5§ 3 0@0 
bO.. ooo 
Americans wounded in Viet Nam. To give this figure of 55f0Ge 
some sense of the pain it has entailed, note that it would be the 
equivalent if every man, woman and child in the city suffered an 
injury in some sudden and appalling disaster in Haverford. 
The civilian analogy is apt because in addition 
to the military casualties which have occurred, the war in Viet 
Nam inflicts great pain on those who are caught up in its cross-
fires and in the incredibly brutal fury which characterizes intra-
Vietnamese political rivalries and hatreds . Major General James 
0 
I 
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H~~phreys, director of our public health efforts in Viet Nam, 
recently estimated that 50,000 civilians would be treated for 
war- related injuries in government hospitals in South Viet Nam 
this year . Of course, this figure says nothing of the countless 
deaths, accidental and unreported which are induced by military 
action. It says nothing of the political murders and mutilations. 
It says nothing of the countless injured who go untreated in a 
l~~d of limited and, in many areas, non-exis~nt medical services. 
The hostile military forces against whom we are 
pitted have also been hard hit. Official sources list the com-
bined total of North Vietna~ese and the Viet Cong killed in action 
• 
in South Viet Nam as 149,000 for 1966, with weekly totals at times 
this year in excess of 2,000. These figures are indicative of the 
great destructiveness of the repertoire of modern weapons which 
has been drawn upon for use in Viet Nam. Yet, enemy forces continue 
the struggle and actually, are growing in numbers. The latest 
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Pentagon figures show enemy strength at record levels--287 ~ 000 
today as compared to 239,000 a year ago. This increase is in the 
face of an estimated loss of half- million in the war to date . 
.,-... 
Hhat was, scarccely t\vO years ago~ preponderantly 
a war among Vietnamese has now become preponderantly war between 
hostile Vietnamese and U.S . forces . The total number of American 
ground forces in Viet Nam went from 45,000 in 1965 to 400,000 by 
the end of 1966 . It is in the neighborhood of 450,000 today and 
there is talk~ even now, of the need for an additional Marine 
division and one or two additional army divisions. The prospect 
lA-~ 
of an increaseAbeyond 500,000 by the end of this year is not to be 
dismissed. This prospect, in fact, is enhanced by the recent 
consignment of new responsibilities to the U.S . military command 
in the work of pacification and the possibilities of the expansion 
of the U. S. military effort into the delta regions of the Mekong . 
United States forces having replaced the Saigon armies as the 
principal combatant on the front lines in the North and Hest of 
J 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 74, Folder 3, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 14 -
South Viet Nam may now be on the way to becoming the major military 
element in the Southern sector and the rear areas. This delta 
region and the work of pacification•have heretofore been consigned 
to the South Vietnamese authorities working in concert with a few 
American civilian and military advisors. 
There is currently, coincident with these changes, 
some expression of views from "anonymous" but "official sources 11 
that a military victory is just around the corner and that it can 
finally be achieved by another new input of American forces and 
effort . The same feeling, however, it should be noted, has been 
present in the past, prior to significant new inputs or usages of 
U. S. military power. And after each added military step, I regr~t 
to note the forecasts of an imminent resolution of the conflict 
have ceased. 
I think it is to be anticipated that the process of 
increasing the U.S. military role in installments will go on, but 
in my judgment the search for a decision by force of arms will be 
as elusive as the quest for a just solution by diplomatic negotia-
I 
tions has so far proved to be . 
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In short, the prospects for a restoration of peace 
in -che near future are not at all encourag::..ng . :Te "Till do \·:ell to 
face, nm·T, the fact that enormous risks lie ahead on the present 
military course . The prospect of a direct military conflict with 
China obviously is somewhere along the path of an expanding \'Tar 
in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia . It is not important that, as a 
matter of policy, ~~e do not \·rish to threaten Ch::.nese interests on 
the Asian mainland and have so stated ~any times. ~lliat is important 
are the implications of our grm..:ing military effort in Viet Nam as 
seen through the spectacles of Chinese xenophobia. The cosmic 
gyrations of the Chinese 11 cultural revolution 11 are indicative of 
the immense enigma which China poses for o~ policies. It is not 
safe to assume, ~rith any degree of assurance, what may be the 
• 
eventual result of this great political upheaval in China . It 
may mean a more militant China; it by no means guarantees a less 
militant China. Insofar as we are concerned, there is no reason 
to expect as a consequence of the inner struggle any reduction in 
Chinese suspicion of us or any remission in the hostility with 
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\':hich they have regarded our course in Viet Nam from the beginning. 
This response to us, in Vie~ ~a~, it should be noted, has its roots 
at least as much in Chinese history and tradition as in Chinese 
ideological theory. 
To reiterate, the Chinese response to us in Viet 
Nam will be little affected by current developments in China, in 
the absence of other changes in the situation. In any event, there 
are signs that the ideological fury within that immense nation has 
begun to abate . Chinese foreign trade has not been cut by the 
action of the Red Guards although it may suffer from the current 
Hong Kong unrest. So far as anyone is a\·:are the nuclear project 
in Lop Nor continues to operate at full blast in the ;;e•t: n deserts 
of Sinkiang. Most important in its implications for Viet Nam, the 
Chinese- Soviet conflict has been put aside at least sufficiently 
to permit Soviet military supplies for Hanoi to flow unimpeded 
overland through China . 
J 
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There is some tendency to dismiss the Chinese 
as a significant factor in the considerations which should be given 
our course in Viet Nam. A preoccupation with the possibilities of 
a U.S.-Chinese clash is regarded in some quarters as unwarranted, 
to say the least. The view is that the Chinese dragon, out of 
preoccupation or prudence, will bellow but not bite. It would be 
well to recall that similar sentiments were expressed in connection 
with Korea. Indeed, they were expressed in a kind of whistling in 
the dark even after the initial reports began to come in that the 
Chinese had crossed the Yalu and clashed with U.S. forces in the 
far North. 
Since my memory goes b~ck that far, I hope you will 
forgive me if I reiterate ~hat the prospect of war with China 
emerging from the Vietnamese conflict cannot be dismissed . And 
I hope you will forgive me if I reiterate, too, what I reported on 
~<t-1).. 
returning from Viet Nam ~ years ago. I said then and I repeat 
(..ou.JUq ~ 
now: the war in Viet Nam ~ open-ended and the end is not in sight. 
/ 
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One of the most significant statements of General Westmoreland, 
the able soldier who comnands the U.S. forces in Viet Nam, on his 
visit in this country a fe,·r weeks ago, \'las that an end of the war 
in Viet Nam is not in sight. Preeumably he meant a military 
termination 'of the war . That \'las the sober opinion of a soldier 
on a matter in which his professional competence gives his opinion 
a special significance . 
In the light of G.- ter~l Hestmoreland 's estimate, 
it \·:ould seem to me to be prudent, as I have stated, to anticipate 
an enlargement of the war in Viet Nam. Yet I do not wish to suggest 
that the war will inevitably escalate towards a grim infinity. I 
have suggested on occasion the possibility of limiting the military 
conflict, so long as it must persist, to South Viet Nam. Indeed, 
the rationale for the bombing of the North can be eliminated on 
the basis of a defensive military barrier on the ground, south of 
the 17th parallel. That could do ···hat aerial bombing of the North 
was expected to do but has not do~e, namely, interdict the lines 
of supply and communication bet~ec~ north and south Viet Nam. 
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Sen~tor John Sherman Cooper, of Kentuc ~y, recently asked that the 
oomoing in the North oe limited to these supply routes and that, 
too, is a s~ep towards limiting the war. 
In the end, however, negotiations alone can supply 
a sure and permanent limitation or termination of the conflict. 
In the end, a way must oe found to negotiate an honorable peace . 
That would oe a peace which is not sought on the oasis of an 
elusive military triumph. Rather it would oe a peace grounded 
in the principle that the rights of the Vietnamese people are 
paramount in this situation. It is their country and their future 
which are at stake. Indeed, that is the principle which President 
Johnson, Ho Chi Minh and all others concerned have contended is 
the oasis for the current military efforts. The proolem 'is how 
to initiate negotiations which mi ~ht lead to a common concept of 
the principle and agreement on means oy which it is to oe put into 
practice. 
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The effort to open negotiations to end the war has 
been so far an exercise in complete frustration. Countless pro-
posals have been advanced and they have come to naught. I have 
long felt, along with many others, for example, that the proper 
. ~ehicle for peace talks is the Geneva Conferences . These con-
ferences brought the war in Inco- China to an end in 1954 and in 
1962, produced a treaty which, whatever its shortcomings, did 
return a measure of peace to a Laos on ~he verge of collapse. 
The Geneva Conference has the merit of being recognized not only 
by North Viet Nam, but by Chi na . Getting the Conference partici-
pants to face up to their responsibilities, however, is another 
matter. 
I have also sougPt to have greater attention given 
to the views General de Gaulle and Cambodia's Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk and U Thant and I have advocated a meeting between 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and China's foreign minister, Chen Yi. 
An all-Asian conference of friend and foe alike has also been 
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proposed as an elaboration of last yenr's ~~nila meeting . I have 
urged that the bri ef cease-fi r es ·,..h.;.c·'l · ~ · 1:· .re seen during holiday 
periods in Viet NaT"! be extended and coupled ··~i th a military "stand-
f ast" on land, se'J. and air as a pr e lude to negotiations . I have 
.J-p~ 
suggested that So~th VietNam's borders be inspecte~by the three-
nat~on International Control Con~izsion . 
~~en it became apparent that traditional secret 
diplomacy had failed to open up a road to negtiations , I began to 
urge last fall a formal and open U.N. contribution to the effort to 
restore peace sho·.lld be sought . \Hth all due respect to U Thant , 
the dedicated Secretary- General, the U. N. as an organization has yet 
to face up to the responsibili t.; eo \·:!Jich are imposed by this situation . 
I do not th:nk -anyonz exncc+s miracles from that 
organization but I do think that all members of the U.N . have &~ 
obligation to make a concerted contribution through its machinery 
to the search for peace . It would appear to me to be most appropriate, 
for example, for the Secu'Y'ity Co·J.ncil to issue a call by formal 
resolution to all l'lho are directly or ind: ,..ectly engaged in Viet Nam--
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member ~~d non-member of the U.N. alike--to confer in New York 
or Geneva . A co~frontation of positions and a consideration of 
v;ays and means to resto!'e peace in Viet Na:n in this fashion is in 
order and it is urgent . I do not kno\-.r v:hether it would be effective 
out I see no reason why it should not be attempted or why this 
nation ~hould not take a strong initiative in connection therewith. 
0 -"-"~ ~~~/VI~,-~-#.,./~~ "'-~~f-
.;.~ .. ~ ~ ud"r. ~tt' £<. ~~'· 
::-n v:::..e,·: of the t: · ~s-~:i.:nat e of the Viet Nam \'tar, 
•,othich I have just given you, yo~ r-ay be asking at this moment: 
''where do I come in O!', perhaps, ~·;here do I get out, or, perhaps, 
when does he get out?H As I told you at the outset, I do not have 
punch-card answers , either for the war in Viet Nam or in terms of 
its personal implications . For you, the concern is direct. The 
draft is already an important con~:dcration in your life. But 
concern for ending the conflict needs to go beyond the immediate 
problems of the draft, import nt that may be to each individual. 
The implications of a ru.Yl-a\o;ay war, \':ith full Chinese involvement 
and even Russia at a later ~tage are stagger·ng to contemplate. 
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Even ,.·ithout a great exp~.nsion, t he lives of addit i onal thousands 
of Americans and Asi~~s , both mi:itary and civilian, are forfeit, 
if we do not achieve an end to this conflict in the near f uture. 
The '·:ell- being of the U.S. econo:ny, which i s, after all the under-
pinning of our international position, is a t stake . The survival 
of hurr.a.nism, if not of huinani ty itself, is i ncrea singly thrown 
into doubt as the persistence of -'.:;he '·:ar induces the removal of 
restraints and an even greater callousness to human suffering . 
As graduates, you have o. special responsi bility 
as \·:ell as a spec~al concern . It ::. s lo.rger than protest . It is 
a responsibility to try to understand and to contribute to the 
understanding of others so that no stone may be left unturned in 
the search for peace . Much has happened since Dien Bien Phu . 
Many persons have been invo::.. ·.reo --Co:T~unists and non- Communists, 
Americans and forei~~ers, Democ~~ts and Republicans . Mistakes have 
been made . Good :.ntentions ra·:c en distorted. At thi s late date, 
the question is not 11 Who got us here and why? 11 but "where do we go 
from her e and how? 11 
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In connection therewith, I hope that.I have at 
least made the point th~~ as one American, as one Senator , I 
b~ieve without reservation that it is in the interests of the 
United States and all others involved in Viet Nam and the world to 
·scale down these hostilities as quickly as possible . I believe it 
is in the common interest to get to the conference table without 
delay, to bring this war to an honorable end and to begin using 
the i~~ense energy and resources which are now preempted by the 
conflict for the constructive works o~ peace . 
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